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ARTICLES
THE CHAINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL
PROCESS IN THE LIBRARY: A POST-USA PATRIOT
REAUTHORIZATION ACT ASSESSMENT
Susan Nevelow Mart*
"In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in
man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the
Constitution."'
The forms of legal process 2 authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act,
3
as they apply to library patron information, implicate both First
Amendment and Fourth Amendment values.4 Seizing evidence of what a
* Faculty Services Librarian and Adjunct Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of
the Law, San Francisco, California. This paper is based in part on a presentation given
by the author at the 100th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Libraries,
New Orleans, July 17, 2007. The author would like to acknowledge the contributions to
this subject made by the writings of Lee Strickland. © 2008 Susan Nevelow Mart
1. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, in THE POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 156, 161 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 16th prtg. 1982).
2. Legal process is a generic term for a court order to produce documents or
information. Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1242 (8th ed. 2004) ("Process validly
issued.").
3. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
4. Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1055 (Colo. 2002).
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person is thinking about by looking at what he or she is reading or
perusing on the Internet is inimical to both of these tenets of the Bill of
Rights. Librarians have been among the strongest critics of the USA
PATRIOT Act's incursions into this realm of intellectual freedom. And
the government has heaped scorn on librarians for their opposition.5 But
librarians do not oppose law enforcement's legitimate efforts to fight
terrorism through the use of legal process in libraries; what librarians
oppose is government fishing expeditions directed at the content of what
people read or access in the library. There is a balance that can easily be
maintained between law enforcement's access to library records and the
protection of library patrons' civil liberties. The USA PATRIOT Act
upsets that balance.
The use of legal process to access library records is not new. In the
1980s, the legislative response to government programs like the Library
Awareness Program,6 which sought the help of librarians in reporting
"suspicious" readers of unclassified information, was the passage of state
statutory protection for library records. 7  Although the statutes vary
widely in their specificity, most do make an exception for libraries to
provide records pursuant to a court order.8  The judicial review
requirement for court orders assures that overly broad requests for library
records will not be issued-that there is, in fact, a constitutionally
sufficient nexus between a specific crime and a specific library user. 9
5. See, e.g., John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Protecting Life and Liberty,
Remarks in Memphis, Tenn. (Sept. 18, 2003), http://www.usdojgov/archive/ag/speeches/
2003/091803memphisremarks.htm; Eric Lichtblau, At F.B.I., Frustration Over Limits on
an Antiterror Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at A48 ("'While radical militant librarians
kick us around, true terrorists benefit from OIPR's failure to let us use the tools given to
US. "').
6. HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, SURVEILLANCE IN THE STACKS: THE FBI's LIBRARY
AWARENESS PROGRAM 10-12 (1991) (describing the Library Awareness Program's
attempt to monitor the reading habits of suspicious and foreign-looking patrons in more
detail).
7. See id. at 133-34; State Laws on the Confidentiality of Library Records,
http://www.library.cmu.edu/People/neuhaus/state-laws.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
All but two states have statutes expressly protecting library records; the two states
without statutes (Kentucky and Hawai'i) have opinions from their attorneys general that
library records are confidential. MARY MINOW & TOMAS A. LIPINSKI, THE LIBRARY'S
LEGAL ANSWER BOOK 200-10 (2003).
8. MINoW & LIPINSKI, supra note 7, at 200-10.
9. Where the government seeks to discover library records because of the content of
what a patron has read or viewed, the First Amendment requires the strictest scrutiny
before any legal process can issue. Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1059.
The chilling effect that results from disclosure of customer purchase records
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With most court-issued orders, because a library is being asked to
produce records,' 0 there is an opportunity to consult with an attorney
before compliance." Libraries are not required to-and may violate
state law if they do-turn over library records in response to overbroad,
improperly issued, or unconstitutional requests for patron records.' 
2
The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act changed the landscape of
legal process in the library. The debate about the USA PATRIOT Act
has been public, vehement, and well documented; 3 but the outcry has
diminished since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization
Acts. 14  This article will discuss the various forms of post-USA
occurs because of the general fear of the public that, if the government
discovers which books it purchases and reads, negative consequences may
follow. However, if the government seeks a purchase record to prove a fact
unrelated to the content or ideas of the book, then the public's right to read and
access these protected materials is chilled less than if the government seeks to
discover the contents of the books a customer has purchased.
Id.
10. See generally Lee S. Strickland, Mary Minow & Thomas Lipinski, Patriot in the
Library: Management Approaches When Demands for Information Are Received From
Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agents, 30 J.C. & U.L. 363, 379 (2004).
11. Although search warrants are immediately executable, there is a penalty for
overbroad or improper search warrants: suppression of the evidence gathered pursuant to
the tainted warrant. This is basic Fourth Amendment law.
If an unreasonable search has been made in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, it is not merely the material seized that cannot be admitted in
evidence. The government may not use the information thus improperly gained
as a means of finding proper evidence. In what the Court has rightly called "a
time-worn metaphor," the government is said to be barred from use of "a fruit
of the poisonous tree."
3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, NANCY J. KING & SUSAN R. KLEIN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 677 (3rd ed. 2004) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Harrison v. United States,
392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
12. See, e.g., Lee S. Strickland, Responding to Judicial Process: A Guide to the
Unexpected for Search Warrants, Subpoenas and Otherwise, 49 VA. LIBR., Spring 2003,
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/VALib/v49--nl/strickland.html.
13. A search for "PATRIOT Act" in the same paragraph as "libraries" in Westlaw's
"Journals and Law Reviews" database brings up 139 results. The same search in Lexis'
"Law Reviews and Journals" database brings up 275 results. Comparable news searches
were terminated for bringing up too many results. The searches were performed on
October 2, 2007. The public outcry about section 215 has been judicially noted. See
ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (ACLU II), 321 F. Supp. 2d 24,32 (D.D.C. 2004).
14. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); USA PATRIOT Act
Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-178, 120 Stat. 278
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
2008]
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PATRIOT Act process, how those forms of process have been amended
by the Reauthorization Acts, and what areas for public debate and
concern still remain. Librarians have been enormously successful
advocates against portions of the USA PATRIOT Act,15 but there are
many statutory problems affecting civil liberties that still need to be
addressed. There is still plenty of opportunity for advocacy.
I. SECTION 215-THE LIBRARY PROVISION
The original focus of the debate for librarians was section 215.16 It is
fair to say that the library community became section 215's most
outspoken opponent; the section began to be called the "library
provision."'17 The USA PATRIOT Act changed the type of business
records that could be requested from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court ("FISC"), from transportation-related business
records to the records of any business-including libraries.1 8 The pre-
USA PATRIOT Act section concerning records that could be requested
from the FISC clearly had no affect on libraries.' 9 Almost everyone was
surprised to discover there even was a secret foreign-intelligence court.
Section 215 included a permanent and extremely broad gag order,
precluded consultation with an attorney, and contained no provisions for
review of the gag order.2° Section 215 allowed government fishing
expeditions for information from physical library records such as
circulation records or internet-use sign-up sheets, or for information
concerning computer search histories from library computers or servers,
and the library community responded in force.2'
15. See section 215 audit report discussion infra p. 446-47.
16. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287-88 (codified at
50 U.S.C §§ 1861-1863 (Supp. 12001)).
17. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS
RECORDS 8-9 (2007) [hereinafter SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT], http://www.usdoj.gov/
oig/special/s0703a/final.pdf.
18. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. 12001).
19. 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2000).
20. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(d), 1862 (Supp. 12001).
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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II. SECTION 215 WAS SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED BY THE
REAUTHORIZATION ACT
One complaint raised about section 215 orders was that the orders
need not be directed at a particular person. Critics of the section wanted
to return to pre-USA PATRIOT Act standards for issuing an order,
which required that the order be about a specific person who is strongly
suspected of terrorism," instead of the post-USA PATRIOT Act
standard "that the records concerned are sought for an authorized
investigation." 23 Although the Senate version of the Reauthorization Act
did contain language requiring more particularized statements regarding
the target of the order,24 the compromise language that actually passed
only added a weak relevancy standard: the records have to be "relevant
to an authorized investigation. '25  The records are "presumptively
relevant" if they pertain to "an agent of a foreign power," "a suspected
agent," or "an individual in contact with" a suspected agent.26 Under this
broad standard, it is not hard for the government to assert relevancy.
Section 215's original non-disclosure requirement was stringent:
"No person shall disclose to any other person (other than those persons
necessary to produce the tangible things under this section) that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation [("FBI")] has sought or obtained
tangible things under this section. 27 The language precluded the right to
consult an attorney, since an attorney is rarely the "person[] necessary to
produce the tangible things., 28 The USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005 ("Reauthorization Act I") addressed this
22. 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2000) (requiring, in an application for access to
records, that "there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the
person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power").
23. 50 U.S.C. § 186 1(b)(2) (Supp. 112002).
24. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, S. 1389,
109th Cong. § 7 (as reported by Senate, July 22, 2005). The Senate-passed version of
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 required that the
statement of facts show that the records or things sought are relevant to an authorized
investigation and that the things sought pertain to, or are relevant to the activities of, a
foreign power or agent of foreign power, or pertain to an individual in contact with or
known to a suspected agent of a foreign power. Id.
25. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 106(b), 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (West
Supp. 2008)).
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) (Supp. 112002).
28. Id.
2008] 439
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problem, and the recipient of a FISC order for business records is now
expressly authorized to consult with an attorney to obtain legal advice
about the order. 29 The recipient does not have to disclose the attorney's
name to the FBI, but, if asked, must inform the FBI who else knows of,
or will know of, the order.3°
The Reauthorization Act I added judicial review provisions for
section 215 orders by FISC judges.3' If the judge determines that the
petition for review is "not frivolous," the judge has discretion to set aside
or modify an order to produce documents "only if the judge finds that
such order does not meet the requirements of this section or is otherwise
unlawful. 32  So the order cannot be modified because it is onerous,
oppressive, or overbroad. The non-disclosure requirement cannot be
challenged until a year after the order to produce has been issued.33
However, once the one-year moratorium is over, the recipient can file a
petition to modify or set aside the non-disclosure requirement; a FISC
judge must initially determine whether or not the petition is frivolous.
34
If the petition is not frivolous, the court must promptly hear the petition,
but can grant the order "only if the judge finds that there is no reason to
believe that disclosure may endanger the national security of the United
States, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence
investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or
physical safety of any person."35 If the government certifies that there is
a reason to believe "that disclosure may endanger the national security of
the United States or interfere with diplomatic relations," the certification
is conclusive "unless the judge finds ... the certification was made in
bad faith," and the recipient is then bound by the gag order for another
year.36
29. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act § 106(e), 120 Stat. at 197
(codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2008)).
30. USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-178, § 4, 120 Stat. 278, 280 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(d)(2)(C) (West
Supp. 2008)).
31. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act § 106(f)(2), 120 Stat. at
198 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(o (West Supp. 2008)). Review of a petition
challenging a section 215 order shall be conducted in camera. Id.
32. Id. (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2008)).
33. USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act § 3, 120 Stat. at
278-79 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West Supp. 2008)).
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id.
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There are serious constitutional problems with this scenario. The
gag order imposes a prior restraint of speech about even the most generic
details of the order: no recipient can discuss the mere fact that an order
was received or debate the fact that the order appeared to be a fishing
expedition of the sort that, during debates on the USA PATRIOT Act,
the government consistently denied it ever engaged in. Nor can the
recipient discuss the profound effect the gag order has had on the
recipient's business or personal life. 38  The gag order also applies in
criminal investigations or where the safety of any person is an issue, so
national security need not even be implicated to require the continuation
of the order.39  In invalidating a similar4° non-disclosure provision
imposed on recipients of national-security letters ("NSL"), a district
court stated the following:
To the contrary, NSL recipients are effectively barred from
engaging in any discussion regarding their experiences and
opinions related to the government's use of NSLs. For example,
an NSL recipient cannot communicate to anyone indefinitely that
it received an NSL, the identity of the target, the type of
information that was requested and/or provided, general
statistical information such as the number of NSLs it received in
37. See, e.g., Ashcroft, supra note 5 ("[T]he Department of Justice has neither the
staffing, the time nor the inclination to monitor the reading habits of Americans. No
offense to the American Library Association, but we just don't care."); Alberto R.
Gonzales, Reauthorize the Patriot Act: Congress Should Reauthorize the Patriot Act and
Further Strengthen Homeland Security, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2005, at A29.
38. Responding to the Inspector General's Findings of Improper Use of National
Security Letters by the FBI: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 27-35 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
George Christian, Executive Director, American Library Association).
39. USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act § 3, 120 Stat. at
278-79 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West Supp. 2008)).
40. Although there are substantive differences between the two non-disclosure
provisions (see discussion infra pp. 461-63 for a more detailed review of the non-
disclosure provisions for NSLs), none of those differences militate in favor of the
constitutionality of section 215. The two main differences are that NSL recipients do not
have to wait for a year to challenge the non-disclosure order, and that the imposition of
the non-disclosure order is not automatic. USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 116(a), 120 Stat. 192, 213-14
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(c) (West Supp. 2008)), invalidated by Doe v. Gonzales
(Doe 111), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Id. § 115, 120 Stat. at 211-13 (codified
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (West Supp. 2008)), invalidated in part by Doe I1, 500 F. Supp.
2d 379.
2008]
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the previous month or year, its opinion as to whether a particular
NSL was properly issued in accordance with the applicable
criteria, or perhaps even its opinion about the use of NSLs
generally (e.g., whether NSLs are being used legitimately,
whether their use may be stifling speech, whether the
government may be abusing its power under the statute, etc.).
41
Another problem with the review procedure is that, in the absence of
overt bad faith, the court is absolutely bound by the government's
certification.42 In the context of NSLs, one court found that such a
constraint on judicial review of legislation affecting the First
Amendment to be so severe, that it violated the constitutional provisions
of checks and balances and separation of powers.43 Critics of this section
wanted review of section 215 orders in the federal district courts.44
Access to the federal courts is simpler, and the court procedures are more
familiar, which might broaden the base of lawyers willing to appear in a
hearing challenging a section 215 order.
The final version of the Reauthorization Act I did not exempt
libraries and bookstores from section 215, but it did address some of the
issues raised by the library community. Now, only three of the FBI's
highest-level employees have the authority to make an application to the
FISC for "library circulation records, library patron lists, book sales
records, book customer lists, firearms sales records, tax return records,
educational records, or medical records containing information that
would identify a person. 45 Because of the controversy about the use of
section 215 to procure library records, a section 215 order has never,
according to the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), been issued to
request the production of library records.4 6 The Reauthorization Act I
41. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
42. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act § 106(f)(2), 120 Stat. at
198 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(f)(2)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 2008)).
43. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 411-16. See discussion infra pp. 475-78.
44. NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Sept.
25, 2007), attempts to address this issue by adding provisions allowing federal district
courts and FISA courts to hear petitions.
45. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act §106(a)(2), 120 Stat. at
196 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 186 1(a)(3) (West Supp. 2008)).
46. SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 9. But in a University of Illinois
study in 2002, at least 3.1 percent of the responding librarians reported that they had
received court orders prohibiting them from telling patrons that authorities requested
information, and 2.6 percent of the librarians indicated that they did not answer some of
the questions about service of an order because they believed they were legally prohibited
[Vol. 33
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also added more congressional oversight of section 215 orders and
increased the reporting requirements.47 Before the Reauthorization Acts,
the total number of section 215 orders that requested library or bookstore
records had been the subject of highly contested litigation.48
III. LITIGATING SECTION 215-THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW How
THE USA PATRIOT ACT HAS BEEN UTILIZED
Section 215 litigation has primarily involved Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA") requests.49  ACLU v. United States
Department of Justice ("ACLU P')50 and ACLU v. United States
from doing so. LIBRARY RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF ILL. GRADUATE SCH. OF LIBRARY &
INFO. SCI., PUBLIC LIBRARIES' RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS OF 9/11/2001: ONE YEAR LATER
(2002) [hereinafter LIBRARIES' RESPONSE], http://lrc.lis.uiuc.edu/web/PLCLnum.pdf
There were 553 libraries that responded to the survey when it was initially sent out.
Leigh S. Estabrook, The Response of Public Libraries to the Events of September 11,
2001, 84 ILL. LIBR. 1 (2002), http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/publications/
pdf publications/illibraryv84_nl.pdf. In conversations I have had with lawyers, most
have assumed the librarians were "just mistaken." Of course, the librarians can't defend
themselves. The request could have been informal, but referenced section 215; or, the
library could have been the recipient of a letter stating that information should be
preserved because a section 215 order was going to be issued. There is no way to know.
But one thing the section 215 audit report illustrates is that the DOJ is extremely wary of
anything to do with librarians.
47. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act §106(h)(2), 120 Stat. at
199 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1862(b)(3) (West Supp. 2008)).
48. There have been six cases so far-four reported and two unreported-that have
addressed section 215 since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. For the four reported
cases, see ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (ACLU 1), 265 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003);
ACLU II, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2004); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Def.,
355 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2004) (deciding that plaintiffs request for expedited FOIA
processing was denied, given the lack of evidence of any current public interest in data-
mining software for antiterrorism programs, as opposed to general subject of "data
mining"); Muslim Cmty. Ass'n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, 459 F. Supp. 2d 592 (E.D.
Mich. 2006) (holding that Muslim groups challenge of the constitutionality of section
215, alleging that it chilled their First Amendment rights, survived the government's
standing challenge, but after the Reauthorization Acts amended section 215, the ACLU
withdrew the complaint). For the unreported cases, see ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
No. C 04-4447 PJH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3763; 2005 WL 588354 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11,
2005) (deciding that an ACLU FOIA request need not be processed on an expedited
basis); Gerstein v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, No. C-06-4643 MMC, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89883; 2006 WL 3462658 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2006) (deciding that a request for
expedited FOIA processing of documents relating to unauthorized disclosure of classified
documents was denied).
49. See cases cited supra note 48. The exception is Muslim Community Ass'n of Ann
Arbor v. Ashcroft, which was a direct First Amendment challenge to section 215.
50. ACLUI, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20.
2008]
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Department of Justice ("ACLU i/,,)SI are the cases that directly address
the public's right to know about the government's use of section 215.52
In ACLU I, the ACLU filed suit to compel the Department of Justice
("DOJ") to respond to a FOIA request for "aggregate statistical
information revealing how often DOJ had used the Act's new
surveillance and search provisions: roving surveillance under section
206; pen registers/trap-and-trace devices under section 214; demands for
production of tangible things under section 215; and sneak and peek
warrants under section 213. "53 The public debate about the effect of the
USA PATRIOT Act on Americans' civil liberties was in full swing, and
the ACLU was concerned that the DOJ had "provided only limited
information to the public regarding how, and how often, the new
provisions described above [had] been used.,
54
Some information about aggregate statistics had been released to
Congress in a classified form,55 and some was released only after
congressional threats.56 ACLUI was heard in the D.C. Circuit, which is
notoriously deferential to claims of national security. 57 And this case
was no different. The court deferred to the government's claims that
releasing aggregate statistical information would somehow harm the
national security, noting that Congress had authorized the release of
aggregate statistical data to the public in only one category (orders
approving electronic surveillance), but had limited the dissemination of
other aggregate statistical information.58 The court rejected the ACLU's
argument which claimed that the mere publication of aggregate statistical
51. ACLU II, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24.
52. ACLUI, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20; ACLUII, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24.
53. ACLUI, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
54. Id. at 24.
55. Id. at 24-25.
56. Congress' attempts to secure information about the implementation of the USA
PATRIOT Act have been numerous and only partially successful. See PATRICK LEAHY,
CHARLES GRASSLEY & ARLEN SPECTER, FBI OVERSIGHT IN THE 107TH CONGRESS BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: FISA IMPLEMENTATION FAILURES 9-10 (2003)
[hereinafter LEAHY REPORT], www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003-rpt/fisa.pdf. Some answers
were provided only after a threat to subpoena the Attorney General. Audrey Hudson,
Ashcroft Threatened with Hill Subpoena, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002, at A04. The
LEAHY REPORT concluded: "The Congress and the American people deserve to know
what their government is doing." LEAHY REPORT, supra, at 14 (emphasis added).
57. See Nathan Slegers, Comment, De Novo Review Under The Freedom Of
Information Act: The Case Against Judicial Deference To Agency Decisions To Withhold
Information, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209, 212-13 (2006).
58. ACLUI,265 F. Supp. 2dat30-31.
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information could not in and of itself harm national security, because if it
did, then Congress would not have authorized release for any type of
USA PATRIOT Act surveillance information.59 The court also rejected
the ACLU's argument that Congress was trying to get this aggregate
information to the American people. 60 However, the Attorney General
then voluntarily declassified the number of times the government had
used section 215:
This memorandum confirms I have declassified the number of
times to date the [DOJ], including the [FBI], has utilized
[s]ection 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act relating to the
production of business records. The number of times [s]ection
215 has been used to date is zero (0).
While Congress has regularly been informed regarding the
number of times [s]ection 215 has been used, and while
individual Members of Congress have been able to review that
information, to date we have not been able to counter the
troubling amount of public distortion and misinformation in
connection with [s]ection 215. Consequently, I have determined
that it is in the public interest and the best interest of law
enforcement to declassify this information.6'
The ACLU filed ACLU II after a new FOIA request, one for the
number of times requests for section 215 orders had been submitted by
field offices for approval and for other records relating to section 215,
was denied.62 The ACLU argued that the number of applications could
have no bearing on national security unless they were approved, but the
court once again deferred to the government's declaration that "the
release of the number of section 215 field office requests poses the
continuing potential to 'harm our national security by enabling our
adversaries to conduct their intelligence or international terrorist
activities more securely."'' 63  The court found that the number of
applications would reveal the level of FBI activity, which might "also
59. Id.
60. Id. at 25; see also LEAHY REPORT, supra note 56, at 5, 13.
61. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to Dir. Robert S. Mueller (Sept. 18, 2003),
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030918doj.shtml.
62. ACLUII, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24,27 (D.D.C. 2004).
63. Id. at 36.
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permit an adversary to 'assess the exposure of business records to current
or future operations' and to conclude that 'it is comparatively safe to
conduct certain operations and activities based on the FBI's allocation
and direction of resources." '64  However, as the court in Gerstein v.
United States Department of Justice65 pointed out, claiming that the
release of statistical information about past practices would create a
"road map" for future efforts aimed at purportedly disclosed weaknesses
is "dubious" logic, as past practices are "hardly a reliable indicator that
[the government] will continue [those practices].'66
IV. SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT FINDS LITTLE UTILITY IN THIS FORM
OF LEGAL PROCESS
Congress sided with the ACLU on the issue of making more
information about the use of section 215 available to the public.
Congress had been requesting similar information from the DOJ
unsuccessfully, and the Reauthorization Act I includes an attempt to
redress the problem. Every year, the Attorney General must submit an
unclassified report to Congress containing, in addition to "the total
number of applications made for [section 215 production] orders ... and
total number of such orders either granted, modified, or denied,"
67
the number of such [215] orders either granted, modified, or
denied for the production of each of the following:
(A) Library circulation records, library patron lists, book sales
records, or book customer lists.
(B) Firearms sales records.
(C) Tax return records.
(D) Educational records.
(E) Medical records containing information that would identify a
68
person ....
64. Id. at 37.
65. Gerstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. C-03-04893 RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
41276 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005).
66. Id. at *40-*41 (denying plaintiff's request for FOIA records for summary statistics
on the use of section 213 on other grounds).
67. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177. § 106(h)(3), 120 Stat. 192, 200 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1862(c)(I)(A)-(B)
(West Supp. 2008)).
68. Id. § 106(h)(2), 120 Stat. at 200 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1862(b)(3) (West
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This third provision is new, and allows Congress and the public to
have access to information about the use of section 215 in areas relating
to privacy and other First Amendment rights.69  In addition, the
Reauthorization Act I requires the OIG of the DOJ to conduct a
comprehensive audit of DOJ procedures, to review the effectiveness of
section 215 authority, and report any abuses.70 That audit was released
in March of 2007.71 The audit confirmed that section 215 had not been
used before 2004: a "pure" section 215 order 72 was not approved until
May of 2004, and a "combination" section 215 order was first approved
in February of 2005.13 There had been a total of twenty-one applications
for pure section 215 orders from 2002 to 2005, but the first approval was
in 2004.74 No combination applications were even sent in until 2005. 7"
The release of this information has had no apparent impact on national
security, as none has been reported or alluded to by the government. The
chart on the following pages summarizes the changes that were made to
section 215 by the USA PATRIOT Act and the Reauthorization Acts.
Supp. 2008)).
69. Id. (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1862(c)(2) (West Supp. 2008)).
70. Id. § 106A, 120 Stat. at 200.
71. See SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17.
72. According to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review ("OIPR"), a "pure"
section 215 order is an "application for ... tangible item[s] that is not associated with
applications for any other FISA authority," while a "combination" application refers to a
section 215 order that was added to a request for a FISA pen-register/trap-and-trace
order. Id. at v-vi. For a copy of a section 215 order, see ACLU.org,
http://www.aclu.org/patriotfoia/2003/215 formorder.pdf.
73. SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 17, 35.
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id. at 35. See id. at 26-34 for a detailed discussion of the reasons section 215
orders were not approved.
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83. NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. § 9 (2007).
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The section 215 audit not only lists the actual number of section 215
applications approved between 2000 and 2005-162 orders were
approved and 31 applications were withdrawn-it discusses the reasons
for withdrawals as well as the effectiveness of section 215 as an
investigative tool. 90
One of the orders prepared but never presented was an application
for an order for library records. 91 The applicant's supervisor
would not permit the request to go forward because of the
political controversy surrounding [s]ection 215 requests for
information from libraries. The [National Security Law Branch
("NSLB")] attorney who reviewed the request told the OIG that
she attempted to get approval for the request but that her
supervisor denied it because it involved a library. The Deputy
General Counsel for NSLB told the OIG that he believed [the
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review ("OIPR")] and the
Department would disapprove of the FBI seeking information
from a library, especially since the FBI had not yet obtained its
first [s]ection 215 order.
92
When the field office was advised that the application would not be sent,
the field office obtained the information through other investigative
means. 93 The report does not say which other investigative means were
used.
The section 215 audit report found that the FBI was not very
successful in obtaining section 215 orders: the various sections
disagreed over legal interpretations, there were long delays in
implementing policies and procedures, and there was insufficient funding
to handle the requests.94 And the OIG found that FBI agents did not
understand the process for obtaining a section 215 order-agents just
used other methods of getting the information, including NSLs, grand-
jury subpoenas, and other process that was faster than a section 215
90. SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 17, 23, 26, 35, 73-74.
91. Id. at 28. The request for library records was submitted in November of 2003. Id.
There was another order directed at a university library's records; that order was
rescinded, apparently because of concerns about the Buckley Amendment. Id. at 31-32.
92. Id. at 28.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 60-63.
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order.95
The section 215 audit report also found that "the FBI did not create
any analytical intelligence products based on the information obtained in
response to pure [s]ection 215 orders," and "the evidence showed no
instance where the information obtained from a [s]ection 215 order
resulted in a major case development, such as the disruption of a
terrorist plot."96 The section 215 audit did note that the FBI began using
section 215 more broadly in 2006, after the date of the section 215
audit.97 But so far, an enormous amount of funding, personnel, and
power has been transferred to the FBI with very little to show for it. The
FBI did not articulate, and the section 215 audit report did not document,
any real need for the expanded powers to secure business records that the
USA PATRIOT Act conferred.
What the section 215 audit report did show was thaL political
pressure by librarians was effective: no section 215 orders have been
served on libraries. 98 But libraries and bookstores should be exempted
from the whole process anyway. Section 215 orders are not as simple to
secure as a search warrant, but are more constitutionally suspect: the
rational compromise would be to subject library and bookstore records to
legal process where there is the necessary nexus between the records and
a specific crime, as the FBI appears to have done when the applicant
could not secure a section 215 order for library records.
Although section 215 was scheduled to sunset in 2005, the
95. Id. at 63-64.
96. Id. at 79 (emphasis added). The orders were used primarily to exhaust
investigative leads using information from "driver's license records; apartment leasing
records; [and] credit card records." Id.
97. Id. at 80. In March, 2008, the second OIG audit was released. OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI's USE OF SECTION 215
ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2006 (2008) [hereinafter SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT
II], http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/index.htm. The SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT II
does not mention libraries at all, and does not revise any of the conclusions of the
SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT; it does mention, as a "noteworthy item," that after having an
application turned down twice by the FISA court because "the facts were too 'thin'
and.., this request implicate[s] the target's First Amendment rights," the FBI issued
NSLs for the very same information, despite an identical First Amendment limitation in
the NSL statute. Id. at 33-34, 68. The FBI counsel stated "that she believed that it was
appropriate to issue [the] NSLs because she disagreed with the FISA court." Id. at 72.
98. SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 80. One author has postulated that
framing the debate in terms of library records and not Internet records had an adverse
effect on the extent of the changes actually made in the Reauthorizations Acts. Andrew
E. Nieland, Note, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL L.
REv. 1201,1227(2007).
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Reauthorization Act extended that sunset until December of 2009.99 The
section 215 audit report findings concerning the high cost, legal
confusion, and limited utility of this program are good indications that
the library community should continue to advocate for a return to pre-
USA PATRIOT Act standards when this section comes up for review.
V. THE UPSTART CONTENDER-NATIONAL-SECURITY LETTERS
If the FBI has not been using section 215 to get library records, what
has the FBI been using? Contrary to John Ashcroft's assertion that the
FBI is not interested in what people are reading,'00 we know that
libraries' computer records have been the subject of USA PATRIOT Act
process, and that libraries have been asked for, and have provided,
library records.' 0 1 Since section 215 orders were so difficult to obtain,
NSLs provided an easy alternative for some kinds of information. 0 2 An
NSL is issued administratively by the agency-it is not issued by a
court. 03 So the FBI can issue an NSL without any judicial oversight.
NSLs have been around for a long time, and were originally drafted as
limited exceptions to various statutes requiring stringent notice and
hearing procedures.' 
04
The form of NSL that concerns libraries allows the government to
request subscriber information or electronic-communication transactional
99. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 102(b), 120 Stat. 192, 195 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 note (West
Supp. 2008) (Sunset Provisions)).
100. "[T]he Department of Justice has neither the staffing, the time nor the inclination
to monitor the reading habits of Americans. No offense to the American Library
Association, but we just don't care." Ashcroft, supra note 5.
101. Sometimes the FBI just asked for library records, and was given the information
voluntarily. In a 2002 survey, 49.7 percent of the libraries responding voluntarily
complied with informal law-enforcement requests for information about patrons' reading
habits and Internet preferences in the previous year. LIBRARIES' RESPONSE, supra note
46. See also Dan Mihalopoulos, Suit Contests Anti-Terror Patriot Act, CHI. TRIB., July
31, 2003, at 10 ("An FBI official said Wednesday that Patriot Act powers have been
employed about [fifty] times to examine library computer records. The official also said
law-enforcement agents have not used the act to find out what books or other materials
were checked out of libraries.").
102. See SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT II, supra note 97, at 55-56.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000), invalidated by Doe II, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
104. For a general discussion of the evolution of NSLs, see generally Nieland, supra
note 98, at 1206-11.
[Vol. 33
Legal Process in the Library
records from an "electronic communication service."1°5  Libraries
providing Internet and email access, either through an Internet web page
or through a university email server, are included in the statutory
definition of an "electronic communication service," and are required to
comply with an NSL: "'electronic communication service' means any
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire
or electronic communications ....
Despite this statutory language, NSLs were not the main focus for
critics of USA PATRIOT Act process in the library, perhaps because of
the seeming anonymity of much library computer use: many library
computers have programs that automatically erase user history after a set
amount of time. 0 7 However, when an anonymous internet service
provider ("ISP") was served with an NSL in 2004 and filed suit to protest
the non-disclosure provisions," the debate about NSLs heated up. The
attention of the library community became even more firmly engaged
when a Connecticut library consortium was served with an NSL and filed
suit to enjoin the non-disclosure provision so the recipients could engage
in the public debate over the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT
Act. 109 Although the consortium director told the FBI that no particular
Internet Protocol ("IP") address could be associated with any particular
library or user months after the fact, the FBI agent assured the director
that "we have our ways."
1 10
105. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505(a), 115 Stat. 272, 365 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (Supp. I 2001)), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
Section 2709(a) creates an exception to the statutory requirement that government
agencies must get stored electronic communication information
through compulsory process, such as a subpoena, warrant, or court order.
Section 2709 is a notable exception to these privacy protections because it
permits the FBI to request records upon a mere self-certification-issued to the
ISP or telephone company, not to the subscriber or to any court-that its
request complies with the statutory requirements.
Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe 1), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2000).
107. George Christian, Executive Dir., Library Connection, Inc., They Rose to the
Challenge: Public Librarians Take on the USA PATRIOT Act Through Doe v. Gonzales,
Remarks at the American Association of Law Libraries Annual Meeting (July 14, 2007).
The author's library has such a program on its public computers.
108. Doe 1, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471. See discussion infra pp. 457-59.
109. Doe v. Gonzales (Doe II), 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005). See discussion
infra pp. 457-59.
110. Christian, supra note 107. The consortium understood the FBI's request to mean
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NSLs may be issued to request "subscriber information and toll
billing records information, or electronic communication transactional
records.""' Before the USA PATRIOT Act, NSLs required the
government to show "specific and articulable facts giving reason to
believe that the person or entity to whom the information sought pertains
is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."' 1 2 That standard was
lessened by the USA PATRIOT Act: the government need only certify
that the records "are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,
provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not
conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States."
'" 13
The types of records that can be requested on the government's self-
certification of relevancy are actually fairly broad, because the statutory
language is ambiguous. In its opinion on rehearing Doe I, the court
stated
[t]hat ambiguity is compounded because the NSL directs the
recipient to determine for itself whether any information it
maintains regarding the target of the NSL "may be
considered... to be an electronic communication transaction
record" in accordance with § 2709, but not "contents" of
communications within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
Such information might include the "to," "from," "date," and
"time" fields of all emails sent or received, activity logs
indicating dates and times that the target accessed the internet,
the contents of queries made to search engines, and histories of
that all records from the relevant time period were being requested. Id. For a copy of the
NSL served on the Connecticut library consortium, see ACLU.org, http://www.aclu.org/
images/nationalsecurityletters/assetuploadfile924_25995.pdf.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a) (2000), invalidated by Doe II, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). This section was not revised by the Reauthorization Acts.
112. Id. § 2709(b)(1)(B), invalidated by Doe 111, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
113. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505(a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 272, 365
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1) (Supp. 1 2001)), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp.
2d 379. And the USA PATRIOT Act expanded FBI issuing authority beyond FBI
headquarter officials to include the heads of the FBI field offices. Id. § 505(a)(1)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (Supp. 12001), invalidated by Doe 111, 500 F. Supp. 2d
379. NSLs always had a gag order, and there never has been a sunset provision for
NSLs. See 18 U.S.C. §2709(c) (2000), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379. A
United States person is a United States citizen, "an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence," or certain associations or corporations. 50 U.S.C. § 180 1(i) (2000).
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websites visited. Information requested by NSLs issued
pursuant to § 2709 can also reveal the identity of an internet user
associated with a certain email address, [IP] address, or screen
name. 
114
The self-certification provisions of section 2709, and the lack of judicial
review, meant that the FBI was the sole player in the process-the FBI
decided who would be the target of an NSL, whether the request was "in
the course of an authorized investigation," whether or not the recipient is
a non-U.S. person or a U.S. person, and whether the investigation fully
or partially implicated First Amendment activities.' 15 No other branch of
the government reviews this part of the process."16
VI. THE PRE-REAUTHORIZATION ACT CASES-DOE I AND DOE H
There has already been a fair amount written about the first two
cases to challenge an NSL, but a brief review is necessary to set the stage
for the debate about the Reauthorization Acts and the changes that were
made to the NSL provisions.' 7 Doe I was filed by a still-unknown ISP,
alleging that the NSL statute violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution.'18 The district court found that the
NSL statute prohibited the recipient from consulting an attorney, 119 was
coercive to the reasonable recipient, 2° imposed a permanent prior
restraint on speech in violation of the First Amendment, 121 and
improperly precluded judicial review.122 While the Fourth Amendment
does not preclude issuing administrative subpoenas, there are Fourth
114. Doe 11I, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (citation omitted).
115. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 121-24
(2007) [hereinafter NSL AUDIT REPORT], http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s07O3b/
final.pdf.
116. This lack of review has been a focus of criticism of NSLs. See discussion infra
pp. 473-74.
117. See, e.g., Karl T. Gruben, What Is Johnny Doing in the Library? Libraries, the
U.S.A. PATRIOTAct, and Its Amendments, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 297 (2006); Nieland,
supra note 98, at 1215-24.
118. Doe 1, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
119. Id. at 496.
120. Id. at 503-04.
121. Id. at512.
122. Id. at 506.
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Amendment requirements that must be met for administrative subpoenas
to pass constitutional muster, and the availability of a neutral tribunal to
review the subpoena after it is issued is one of those requirements.
12 3
The NSL statute lacked the constitutional requirement that there be a
neutral tribunal to determine, after a subpoena is issued, whether the
subpoena actually complies with the Fourth Amendment's demands, and
the district court held that the NSL provisions violated the Fourth
Amendment as applied. 124  The court enjoined the government from
enforcing the NSL provisions, but stayed the injunction to allow the
government to appeal. 1
25
The plaintiff in Doe I particularly wanted to be able to discuss,
without revealing whose records had been requested or the nature of the
information requested, the mere fact that the NSL had been served, the
hardships the gag order had created in the recipient's personal and
business life, and, most importantly, the plaintiff wanted to partake in the
national discussion about NSLs that was taking place during the period
when Congress was debating the Reauthorization Acts.126 The court in
Doe I had this to say about the scope of the gag order in section 2709:
[T]he NSL statutes, unlike other legislation cited above, impose
a permanent bar on disclosure in every case, making no
distinction among competing relative public policy values over
time, and containing no provision for lifting that bar when the
circumstances that justify it may no longer warrant categorical
secrecy.... This feature of§ 2 709(c) is extraordinary in that the
breadth and lasting effects of its reach are uniquely exceptional,
potentially compelling secrecy even under some decidedly non-
sensitive conditions or where secrecy may no longer be
justifiable under articulable national security needs. 1
27
The government appealed and the gag order remained in effect
during the national debate on reauthorizing the USA PATRIOT Act; the
government was successful in stifling dissent. 128  The anonymous
123. Id. at495-96.
124. Id. at 526-27.
125. Id.
126. My National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2007, at A17
[hereinafter Gag Order].
127. Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (second emphasis added).
128. See Gag Order, supra note 126.
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recipient has yet to be freed from the provisions of the gag order, despite
the fact that the government no longer has any need for the information
requested in the original order.
129
In the second lawsuit to challenge NSLs, a Connecticut library
consortium' 3 that had been served with an NSL filed suit to lift the gag
order so that it could participate in the national debate about the USA
PATRIOT Act."' The district court's decision enjoined the government
from enforcing the non-disclosure provision of section 2709(c) to the
extent that the provision prevented the recipient from revealing its
identity as a recipient of an NSL, holding that section 2709(c) did not
satisfy the requisite First Amendment strict-scrutiny test, as it was not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.1 32  Again, the
injunction was stayed to allow the government to appeal.
133
Although the identity of the plaintiffs in Doe II had been revealed in
poorly redacted pleadings filed by the government, and publicized in the
press, 134 the plaintiffs in Doe II were still governed by the gag order
while the government appealed the district court order; they were
similarly prevented from participating in the public debate about NSLs
that had been taking place during the hearings on the Reauthorization
Acts. 135
George Christian is one of the Connecticut librarians who was served
with an NSL in Doe II, and his was one of the voices that was silenced
during the public debate. Mr. Christian spoke at the 2007 American
Association of Law Libraries annual meeting. In both his presentation
and his testimony before Congress in April of 2007, Mr. Christian was
129. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The government
dropped its request for the information in November of 2006. See Gag Order, supra note
126.
130. The consortium's "primary function is to provide a common computer system that
controls the catalog information, patron records, and circulation information of our
libraries. . . . At the time we were served with a national security letter, in July 2005, we
were also providing telecommunications services to half our member libraries." Hearing,
supra note 38, at 27 (statement of George Christian, Executive Director, American
Library Association).
131. Doe II, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005). At the time the consortium was
served, the decision in Doe I had been issued.
132. Id. at 82.
133. Id. at 82-83.
134. Alison Leigh Cowan, A Court Fight to Keep a Secret That's Long Been Revealed,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, at B1.
135. See Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006). This is the opinion on the
consolidated appeals in Doe I and Doe II.
2008]
Oklahoma City University Law Review
eloquent about the need for libraries to continue their measured and
thoughtful resistance to government fishing expeditions for library
records. 136 The NSL he was served was not for material the FBI needed
urgently-the NSL was not even delivered until almost two months after
it was written. 13 The request was incredibly broad: in order for the FBI
to "mine" for the information it requested, the consortium would have
been required to turn over all records of computer use for all the
computers in the library for the relevant time period. 138 The consortium
needed the FBI's permission to even consult with an attorney. 139 And the
government refused to allow any discussion of even the fact that an order
had been served until after the Reauthorization Acts had passed. 40 The
lengths to which the government was willing to go to prevent the
consortium members from speaking out were striking. During court
arguments in the Second Circuit on lifting the gag order, when the entire
world already knew who the plaintiffs were,
the government argued that merely revealing [the plaintiffs] as
recipients of [an NSL] would violate national security. [The
plaintiffs'] attorneys filed more legal papers to try to lift the gag,
and attached copies of the New York Times articles. The
government claimed that all the press coverage revealing [the
plaintiffs'] names did not matter because 1) no one in
Connecticut reads the New York Times and 2) surveys prove
that 58% of the public disbelieves what they read in newspapers.
To add to the absurdity, the government insisted that the copies
of the news stories [the plaintiffs'] attorneys had submitted
remain under seal in court papers. Even though [the plaintiffs']
names were not thoroughly redacted from the court documents,
the government did redact from [the plaintiffs'] affidavits [their]
136. Christian, supra note 107; Hearing, supra note 38, at 27-35 (statement of George
Christian, Executive Director, American Library Association). Mr. Christian is very
clearly not a hothead, and seemed completely bewildered by the absurdity of the
government's position on the need for secrecy. Among the passages in the pleadings that
the government attempted to redact for national-security purposes, were portions of
United States Supreme Court decisions. Christian, supra note 107.
137. Christian, supra note 107.
138. Id.
139. See Hearing, supra note 38, at 30 (statement of George Christian, Executive
Director, American Library Association).
140. Doe v. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 1301 (2005) (declining to lift gag order). The gag
order was not lifted until May 2006. Gonzales, 449 F.3d at 421.
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claim that forty-eight states had laws protecting the privacy of
patron library records. [The plaintiffs] could not understand the
threat to national security this information posed, but [they] did
note that Attorney General Gonzales claimed to Congress that
there was no statutory justification for claims of privacy. 141
The government even tried to redact "direct quotes from Supreme
Court opinions that undercut the government's arguments in the case."'
142
One of the quotes was "The danger to political dissent is acute where the
Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to
protect 'domestic security.' Given the difficulty of defining the domestic
security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest
becomes apparent.
' 143
After the Reauthorization Acts passed, the government withdrew its
opposition to the disclosure of the identities of the Doe II recipients and
then decided it did not need the information it had requested in the NSL;
the Second Circuit dismissed Doe H as moot, and remanded Doe I to the
district court in New York to determine the validity of the revised
provisions of section 2709(c). 144 The government had successfully used
the specter of national security to prevent dissent and stifle free speech,
not to protect the public from terrorism.
VII. THE REAUTHORIZATION ACTS CHANGED THE USA PATRIOT ACT
NSL PROVISIONS ON NONDISCLOSURE, JUDICIAL REVIEW, LIBRARIES,
AND OVERSIGHT
The Reauthorization Act I amended the blanket prohibition on
disclosure imposed by the USA PATRIOT Act. 145 A non-disclosure
order will be included in an NSL only if a certification is added "that
otherwise there may result a danger to the national security of the United
States, interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or
141. Christian, supra note 107.
142. Press Release, ACLU, Reauthorized Patriot Act Still Unconstitutional, ACLU
Says (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nationalsecurityletters/26404prs
20060807.html.
143. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
144. Gonzales, 449 F.3d at 421.
145. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(c) (West Supp. 2008), invalidated by Doe Ill, 500 F. Supp. 2d
379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations,
or danger to the life or physical safety of any person.' ' 146 While the gag
order provision no longer automatically attaches to the NSL, it is still a
self-certification process; no one reviews the need for certification.
Given the FBI's position on disclosure in Doe I and Doe II, it is not
surprising that the new guidelines for issuing NSLs indicate that "in most
situations non-disclosure will be appropriate."' 147 In 2006, under the new
guidelines, at least ninety-seven percent of the NSLs examined imposed
the non-disclosure requirements on recipients. 141
If there is a non-disclosure certification, then the recipient may not
disclose the NSL to anyone except those persons whose assistance is
needed to comply with the order or to obtain legal advice; the recipient
has to inform the FBI of the identity of those who have been, or will be
told of the NSL, except that the recipient need not tell the FBI the
attorney's identity. 149 So the right to consult with an attorney is now
explicit. The recipient of an NSL also has to inform anyone who is told
of the NSL of the non-disclosure requirements.15 0 A specific penalty for
violating the non-disclosure requirement has been added, and the penalty
is severe:
Whoever, having been notified of the applicable disclosure
prohibitions or confidentiality requirements of section 2709(c)(1)
of this title... knowingly and with the intent to obstruct an
investigation or judicial proceeding violates such prohibitions or
requirements applicable by law to such person shall be
imprisoned for not more than five years, fined under this title, or
146. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 116(a), 120 Stat. 192, 213 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(c) (West Supp.
2008)), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
147. Memorandum from Gen. Counsel of Nat'l Sec. Law Policy & Training Unit to all
FBI Divs. 12 (June 1, 2007), http://epic.org/privacy/nsl/NewNSLGuidelines.pdf.
148. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBIs
USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND
EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006 160 (2008) [hereinafter NSL AUDIT REPORT II],
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBUindex.htm.
149. USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-178, § 4(b), 120 Stat. 278, 280 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(c)(4) (West
Supp. 2008)), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
150. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act § 116(a), 120 Stat. at 213
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(c)(3) (West Supp. 2008)), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F.
Supp. 2d 379.
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both.151
VIII. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Reauthorization Act I added a provision for judicial review of
the scope of an NSL, by allowing the recipient to file a petition in federal
district court for an order to modify or set aside the NSL.152 In addition,
the government was given the means to enforce an NSL by requesting a
court order to compel compliance. 153 All proceedings regarding NSLs
are closed. 154 A recipient may also a file petition to modify or set aside
the non-disclosure requirement. 155 If the petition is filed within one year
of the issuance of the NSL, the court can modify the non-disclosure
requirement
if it finds there is no reason to believe that disclosure may
endanger the national security of the United States, interfere
with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence
investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, or endanger
the life or physical safety of any person. If, at the time of the
petition,... [the government] certifies that disclosure may
endanger the national security of the United States or interfere
with diplomatic relations, such certification shall be treated as
conclusive unless the court finds that the certification was made
in bad faith.'56
The "enumerated harms"'157 cover a lot of potential situations that have
nothing to do with national security or terrorism, including every
criminal investigation, and any threat of physical harm to a person.
151. Id. § 117, 120 Stat. at 217 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1510(e) (West Supp. 2008))
(emphasis added). The fine is $250,000 for an individual and $500,000 for an entity. 18
U.S.C. § 3571 (2000).
152. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act §115, 120 Stat. at 211-13
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (West Supp. 2008)), invalidated in part by Doe 11I, 500
F. Supp. 2d 379.
153. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(c) (West Supp. 2008)).
154. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(d) (West Supp. 2008)).
155. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(b) (West Supp. 2008)), invalidated by Doe III,
500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
156. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 351 1(b)(2) (West Supp. 2008)), invalidated by Doe
III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (emphasis added).
157. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (referring collectively to the conditions in the
statute as the "enumerated harms").
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If the petition to modify the non-disclosure requirement is made
more than a year after the NSL was issued, then, within ninety days, a
high-ranking official must either terminate the gag order or recerti that
lifting the gag order will endanger national security, "interfere with a
criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere
with diplomatic relations," or endanger the life or safety of any person;
the government's recertification is conclusive unless it is made in bad
faith. 1 58 If the government recertifies, the recipient of the gag order has
to wait another year to request termination of the order.' 59
The reasons to get and maintain a gag order are broad, and include
criminal investigations, so there is no need for a national security nexus
to allow the government to prevent a recipient from speaking. And the
government's certifications are conclusive, making judicial review
illusory.
IX. THE LIBRARY EXEMPTION
The USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act
of 2006 ("Reauthorization Act II") added a "library" exemption:
libraries that provide Internet access are exempt unless they are
"providing the services defined in [18 U.S.C. §] 2510(15)., ' 60 However,
since section 2510(15) defines an "electronic communication service" as
"any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive
wire or electronic communications,"'' 61 the exception may be so broad
that it swallows the exemption. During the reauthorization debates,
Senator Leahy stated that "[A] library may be served with an NSL only if
it functions as a true [ISP], as by providing services to persons located
outside the premises of the library. I expect that this will occur rarely or
never and that in most if not all cases, the [g]overnment will need a court
order to seize library records for foreign intelligence purposes."' 162 John
Conyers disagreed, stating that the exemption was nothing but a "fig
158. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act § 115, 120 Stat. at 212
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (b)(3) (West Supp. 2008)), invalidated by Doe 111, 500 F.
Supp. 2d 379 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-178, § 5, 120 Stat. 278, 281 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(0 (West Supp.
2008)), invalidated by Doe 111, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2000).
162. 152 CONG. REc. S1558 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2006) (Statement of Sen. Leahy).
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leaf."163 And apparently Robert Mueller, the director of the FBI, "in a
written response to a Senate Judiciary Committee inquiry, even stated
that new language 'did not actually change the law. '164
Since many libraries are part of entities that do offer "electronic
services" in the form of e-mail servers, or offer database or email
services to patrons "outside the premises," these libraries-academic,
law firm, library consortia, and public-would not be exempt even under
a restrictive interpretation of the library exemption. While the scope of
the exemption remains to be fully litigated, one lawsuit that has settled
suggests the FBI thinks that libraries are not exempt; in Internet Archive
v. Mukasey, 65 the FBI issued an NSL to the Internet Archive, 166 a digital
library. The ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation represented
the Internet Archive, and were not only successful in convincing the FBI
to withdraw the NSL, but also to lift the gag order, so that the service of
the NSL on a library could be publicized.
167
163. Id. at H585 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2006) (Statement of Rep. Conyers).
164. Hearing, supra note 38, at 29 (statement of George Christian, Executive Director,
American Library Association).
165. Internet Archive v. Mukasey, No. 07-6346-CW (N.D. Cal. 2008).
166. To view the Internet Archive website, see Internet Archive,
http://www.archive.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
167. Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., FBI Withdraws Unconstitutional National
Security Letter After ACLU and EFF Challenge: Gag Order Lifted on Internet Archive,
Allowing Founder to Speak Out for First Time (May 7, 2008),
http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/05/06.
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The chart below summarizes the changes made to NSLs by the USA
PATRIOT Act and the Reauthorization Acts.
After the Proposals
18 Us~c. Before the After the R-i h18 U.S.C. UASARe- in the
§ USA USA Auhrato11h
§ 2709 PATRIOT Act PATRIOT Act Authorization 110th
Act Congress
Records Subscriber The same. The same. House Bill





records.1 68 By requiring
its terms, the privileged









168. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a) (2000), invalidated by Doe 111, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
169. Id. § 2709, invalidated by Doe I11, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
170. National Security Letters Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3189, 1 10th Cong. § 3(c)(1)
(2007).
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171. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(l)(B) (2000), invalidated by Doe 111, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
172. Id. § 2709(b)(1) (Supp. 12001), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
173. National Security Letter Judicial and Congressional Oversight Act, H.R. 1739,
110th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2007).
174. NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007).
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176. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2000), invalidated by Doe II, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
177. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(c) (West Supp. 2008), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d
379.
178. Id. § 1510(e) (2000).
179. Id. § 2709(c) (West Supp. 2008), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
180. National Security Letter Judicial and Congressional Oversight Act, H.R. 1739,
110th Cong. §2(b) (2007).
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182. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (West Supp. 2008), invalidated in part by Doe III, 500 F.
Supp. 2d 379.
183. See Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
184. H.R. 3189.
185. NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007).
Before the After the After the Proposals
18 U.S.C. Re- in the§ USA USA Auhrzto10h
§ 2709 PATRIOT Act PATRIOT Act Authorization 110th
Act Congress
Review of No. o. Yes. 182 Judicial House Bill
the Order review in federal 3189 authorizes
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Before the After the After the Proposals
18 U.S.C. USA USA Re- in the
§ 2709 PATRIOT Act PATRIOT Act Authorization 110th
Act Congress
Library No. No. Yes. Exempts Libraries that
Section libraries unless host Internet
they provide the services 187 are
services listed in clearly not
18 U.S.C. § exempt under
2510(15);186 this section.
exception is so Legislative
broad it appears history does not
to swallow the resolve the
exemption, issue.
















X. THE NSL AUDIT REPORT
The Reauthorization Acts expand congressional oversight of NSLs190
186. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(f) (West Supp. 2008), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d
379.
187. See id. § 2510(15) (2000).
188. H.R. 3189 § 5(a).
189. S. 2088 § 8.
190. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
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and call for an Inspector General's audit of the use of the authority.' 91 In
March of 2007, the Inspector General released its report concerning the
use of NSLs for the years 2003 through 2005.192 The NSL audit report is
huge-the executive summary is over fifty pages-but there are many
facts of interest to the library community and others concerned about the
intersection of the First and Fourth Amendments.
The use of NSLs has increased dramatically, expanding from 8,500
requests in 2000 to 47,000 in 2005.193 Because of poor or non-existent
record keeping, the FBI's database "significantly understates the number
of FBI NSL requests," but the total number listed as issued from 2003
through 2005 is 143,074.194 Based on the NSL audit report's sample
study of case files, the numbers in the database are underreported by
seventeen percent. 195 Because of "delays in uploading NSL data and the
flaws in the [Office of General Counsel ("OGC")]1' 96 database, the total
numbers of NSL requests that were reported to Congress semiannually in
[calendar years] 2003, 2004, and 2005 were significantly understated."',
97
During the three years under review, the percentage of NSLs used to
investigate "U.S. persons" increased from thirty-nine percent in 2003 to
fifty-three percent in 2005.'98 The NSL audit report also found that in
twelve percent of the case files examined, the investigative target of the
NSL was described as a non-U.S. person when the target was described
in the approval memoranda in the investigative file as, in fact, a U.S.
person. 199 So in those cases, the FBI was able to ignore the First
Amendment restrictions imposed on targeting U.S. persons.2 °0
177, § 118, 120 Stat. 192, 217-18 (2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681v(f) (2006)).
191. Id. § 119, 120 Stat. at 219-21. There was an additional 4.7% increase in the
number of NSLs issued in 2006, to 49,425. NSL AUDIT REPORT II, supra note 148, at
159.
192. NSL AUDIT REPORT, supra note 115, at viii.
193. Id. at 120.
194. Id. at xviii.
195. Id. at xvi.
196. The OGC is the FBI's Office of General Counsel. Id. at xv.
197. Id. at xvii.
198. Id. at 38.
199. Id. atxlv-xlvi.
200. To issue the NSL, the FBI must self-certify that the records requested are
"relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States
person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment." 18 U.S.C. 2709(b)(2) (Supp. I 2001), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F.
Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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The NSL audit report is critical of the FBI's initial performance:
"[W]e found that.., the FBI used NSLs in violation of applicable NSL
statutes, Attorney General guidelines, and internal FBI policies., 20 1 And
the NSL audit report found that the only FBI data-collection system
produced "inaccurate" results,20 2 and "a significant number of NSL-
related possible violations are not being identified or reported" as
required.0 3 Sixty percent of the individual files examined "contained
one or more violations of FBI internal control policies relating to
[NSLs].,, 204 The FBI regularly issued NSLs in a manner that provided no
mechanism to ensure that NSLs were issued in the course of authorized
investigations, or to ensure that the information sought in the NSLs was
relevant to those investigations.20 5 In other words, NSLs could be, and
were, issued for records regardless of their nexus to national-security
investigations.
The DOJ's own audit, a much larger sample than the NSL audit
report, found similar numbers of misuses of orders, according to FBI
General Counsel Valerie Caproni.2 6 And the FBI's most recent review
indicates that, in fact, "[t]he FBI improperly used [NSLs] in 2006 to
obtain personal data on Americans during terror and spy
,,207investigations. Despite the ease with which the agency could issue
NSLs without substantive or procedural compliance with the law, there
were times when the DOJ simply could not be bothered to meet its own
minimal standards. For those situations, the agency used exigent letters.
201. NSL AUDIT REPORT, supra note 115, at 124.
202. Id. at 121.
203. Id. at 123. The NSL audit report found that twenty-two percent of the files
reviewed contained unreported, NSL-related possible violations. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. John Solomon, FBI Finds It Frequently Overstepped in Collecting Data, WASH.
POST, June 14, 2007, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/13/AR2007061302453.html ('The FBI's comprehensive
audit of [NSL] use across all field offices has confirmed the inspector general's findings
that we had inadequate internal controls for use of an invaluable investigative tool,' FBI
General Counsel Valerie E. Caproni said."). The audit covered ten percent of the records,
and found potential violations of the law "or agency rules more than 1,000 times while
collecting data about domestic phone calls, e-mails and financial transactions in recent
years." Id.
207. Lara Jakes Jordan, FBI Chief Says Report Will Show Additional Improper Use of
Subpoenas in Terror, Spy Cases, LAW.COM, Mar. 5, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1204716628871. The report is a follow-up to the earlier report. Id.
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XI. EXIGENT LETTERS
One of the problems the NSL audit report discussed was the use of
exigent letters to get information before an NSL was issued.20 8 Both in
cases where there was no documented investigation and in cases where
an NSL was never issued, exigent letters were issued at least 739
times.20 9 The letters typically stated: "Due to exigent circumstances, it is
requested that records for the attached list of telephone numbers be
provided. Subpoenas requesting this information have been submitted to
the U.S. Attorney's Office who will process and serve them formally to
[information redacted] as expeditiously as possible. 210
The language of the letters could just as easily apply to providing an
IP address as a telephone number. "[T]he 739... letters requested
information on [about] 3,000 different telephone numbers.' 21 The
service providers turned over records without ever receiving the NSL,
21 2
or turned over more information than the FBI requested.1 3 A service
provider who knowingly or intentionally violates the prohibition on
providing "content" is subject to civil liability, but there are no criminal
penalties for the breach.214 If section 215 orders were too difficult for the
FBI to use, NSLs turned out to be too easy.
The OIG-and librarians-are not the only groups to criticize the
FBI for its misuse of NSLs. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board (PCLO Board) was created by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.215 One of the PCLO Board's
statutory mandates is to "ensure that concerns with respect to privacy and
civil liberties are appropriately considered in the implementation of laws,
regulations, and executive branch policies related to efforts to protect the
Nation against terrorism. ' 216 The PCLO Board's role is to advise and
oversee. As part of its first statutory report, the PCLO Board said it
208. NSL AUDIT REPORT, supra note 115, at 86.
209. Id. at 86, 89.
210. Id. at 89.
211. Id. at 90.
212. Id.
213. Solomon, supra note 206.
214. 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (Supp. 112002).
215. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3684-88 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ee (West
Supp. 2008)).
216. Id. § 1061(c)(3), 118 Stat. at 3685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000ee(c)
(West Supp. 2008)) (emphasis added).
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would review the OIG report regarding the FBI's use of NSLs. 17 The
PCLO Board is going to issue its own recommendations for solving the
problems, but in the meantime, it had this to say: "The cause of
protecting the nation from terrorism is not advanced by undermining the
public's confidence in the government's ability to exercise investigative
powers in compliance with applicable legal standards and required
procedures.... Safeguards for privacy and civil liberties are not mere
procedural formalities."
'2 18
The OIG agrees, and in its latest report to Congress, in which the
goals for the DOJ are listed, the OIG
added the challenge of "Restoring Confidence in the Department
of Justice." The Department has faced significant criticism of its
actions that has affected the morale of Department employees
and the public confidence in the decisions of Department leaders.
This turmoil, combined with numerous high-level vacancies,
creates a significant challenge for Department leaders to
reestablish public confidence in the independence and integrity
of the Department.219
A goal carried over from previous reports was "to balance aggressive
pursuit of its counterterrorism responsibilities with the need to protect
individual privacy rights and civil liberties. This year, the OIG found
significant problems in this challenge in an important area., 220 For the
DOJ, "striking the appropriate balance between meeting its critical
counterterrorism-related responsibilities and respecting civil rights, civil
liberties, and privacy rights remains a key challenge.,
22'
The FBI had not proved by specific examples that the current use of
NSLs results in timely and useful intelligence. When the PCLO Board
217. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: MARCH 2006-MARCH 2007 iii (2007). A copy of the report is archived at
http://blog.wired.com/2 7bstroke6/jiles/pclob-congress2OO7.pdf
218. Id. at iv.
219. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: APRIL 1, 2007-SEPTEMBER 30, 2007 39
(2007) [hereinafter SEMIANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/
semiannual/0711/final.pdf.
220. Top Management and Performance Challenges in the Department of Justice-2007,
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issued its second annual report, there was harsh criticism of the FBI's
ability to defend the use of NSLs in their present form:
[T]he FBI has not made a conscious, direct, and thorough effort
to explain to the public and to Congress exactly why NSLs
should be retained in their current form. Specifically, it has not
made a comprehensive, detailed, and positive argument that
NSLs collect essential information in the most timely and
effective manner. It has not engaged critics of NSLs with
sufficiently detailed information and specific instances of NSL
use to allow policymakers to make informed decisions. It has
also not described the elements of the current NSL regime that
are essential to its operation. Finally, it has not discussed or
shown how the current NSL regime appropriately limits risks to
222the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. Persons.
While the challenges posed by the PCLO Board have still not been met,
the second NSL audit report does finally include some actual examples
of the utility of NSLs as an investigative tool-in eight cases out of
49,425 NSLs issued. 3
XII. DOE Ill-THE NSL STATUTE STILL VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION
Since some of the changes that were made to the NSL provisions
directly addressed the constitutional deficiencies pointed out by the
district court in Doe I, the case was remanded so that the plaintiff could
amend its complaint in light of the Reauthorization Acts.224 Judge
Marrero ruled that the changes made by the Reauthorization Acts were
insufficient to insulate NSLs from First Amendment and separation of
powers challenges.2 25 The Doe III court held that the revised non-
disclosure provisions, which allowed the FBI to determine, on a case-by-
case basis, whether a non-disclosure order should be included with the
NSL, continued to act as a content-based restriction on speech by
creating an impermissible licensing scheme in violation of the First
222. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: MARCH 2007-JANUARY 2008 24 (2007), http://www.privacyboard.gov/
reports/2008/congress2008.pdf.
223. NSL AUDIT REPORT II,supra note 148, at 114-16, 159.
224. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
225. Id. at 387.
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Amendment.226 The court noted:
[u]nfortunately, one necessary consequence of the resulting
discretion now afforded the FBI is that the amended 2709(c)
creates the risk not only that an "entire topic" of public debate
will be foreclosed, but also the risk that the FBI might engage in
actual viewpoint discrimination. By now allowing the FBI to
pick and choose which NSL recipients are prohibited from
discussing the receipt of an NSL, conceivably the FBI can
engage in viewpoint discrimination by deciding to certify
nondisclosure when it believes the recipient may speak out
against the use of the NSL and not to require nondisclosure when
it believes the recipient will be cooperative.227
The district court also held that the standard prescribed by Congress
for judicial review of the non-disclosure orders "is plainly at odds with
First Amendment jurisprudence which requires that courts strictly
construe content-based restrictions and prior restraints to ensure they are
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest." 228 The
imposition of congressional standards of court review rendered judicial
review illusory, and violated separation of powers. 229 The court held that
"'Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting
and applying the Constitution,' ' 230 and that such an attempt "breaches
the proper constitutional limits drawn for our government by the
concepts of separation and balance of power.,
231
One problem addressed by Doe I was not resolved by the
Reauthorization Acts, and that is the problem that results when an NSL
asks for transactional records without providing the recipient any
guidance. The statute merely "directs the recipient to determine for itself
226. Id. at 425 ("[Section] 2709(c) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment
because it functions as a licensing scheme that does not afford adequate procedural
safeguards, and because it is not a sufficiently narrowly tailored restriction on protected
speech.").
227. Id. at 397-98. In support of its opinion, the court also cited, as one of its
authorities, the very Supreme Court quotation about the danger of acting under the vague
concept of protecting domestic security that the FBI had originally redacted from the
pleadings in Doe I. See id. at 407 (quoting Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972)).
228. Id. at 409.
229. Id. at411.
230. Id. (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000)).
231. Id.
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whether any information it maintains regarding the target of the NSL" is
responsive, and whether the information is a "record" but not "contents."
232 So the response to an NSL could improperly reveal the "dates and
times that the target accessed the [I]nternet, the contents of queries made
to search engines, and histories of websites visited., 233  In fact, the
second NSL audit report documents fourteen instances in 2006 where the
recipient of the NSL provided too much information, including content,
in response to an NSL.234 In one of those instances, which was reported
in the press, the FBI received the email messages from an entire
computer network rather than one email subscriber; an anonymous
intelligence official stated that "It's inevitable that these things will
happen. It's not weekly, but it's common. 2 35
Allowing the recipient of an NSL to determine what is "content,"
and then provide it to the government, means the government can acquire
content without a warrant, which violates the Fourth Amendment
requirement that a warrant be issued for content.236 An NSL statute that
allows the collection of content without a warrant is a statute in serious
need of amendment. After both administrative and judicial investigation
of NSL power, it is clear that the NSL statute gave the FBI and the
executive branch too much discretion, which the FBI has been abusing.
Giving one agency the power to determine the need for, issue, and
232. Id. at 387.
233. Id. The court's decision has, of course, been appealed. The appeal was filed
November 6, 2007 in the Second Circuit (Docket No. 07-4943).
234. NSL AUDIT REPORT II, supra note 148, at 139-41.
235. Eric Lichtblau, Through an Error, F.B.I. Gained Unauthorized Access to E-Mail,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at Al.
236. The warrant requirement for process directed to content is a basic tenet of Fourth
Amendment law. Cf Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (discussing that
no search had occurred and no warrant was required for a pen register which did not
record content but only phone numbers dialed). Although the plaintiffs in Doe I, 334 F.
Supp. 2d 471, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated and remanded sub nom. Doe v. Gonzales,
449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006), dropped their Fourth Amendment due-process claims in
light of the provision for judicial review added by the Reauthorization Acts, Doe III, 500
F. Supp. 2d at 389, other courts have held that vesting discretion in the recipient of an
order to determine what is "content" in orders, such as pen-register orders, may violate
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing
Use of a Pen Register and Trap on (XXX) Internet Serv. AccountlUser Name
(xxxxxxxx@xxx.com), 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49-50 (D. Mass. 2005) (denying the
government's request for a pen-register order that might reveal content, such as search
phrases in the URL, unless the order notified the recipient of the pen register specifically
of what could be provided, and imposed contempt-of-court violations as a sanction for
providing content). See discussion infra pp. 495-98 for a more comprehensive discussion
of this and other pen register cases.
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execute subpoenas without sufficient judicial oversight is not a model
destined to produce restraint.237
The changes made to the NSL statute should not be permanent, and
the debate over their use needs to continue. One of the three bills
introduced in the 1 10th Congress to amend the NSL provisions has a
sunset provision.238 The National Security Letter Reform Act requires
that section 2709 sunset in December of 2009, and that it revert to its
pre-USA PATRIOT Act language.2 39 This Bill would also limit the
information that can be requested by an NSL, and limit the effect of the
non-disclosure order to a narrowly tailored thirty-day order, renewable
for one hundred eighty days.240 Whether reforms take place in the 110th
Congress or in the 11 1th Congress, they need to take place. It is too soon
to stop pressuring Congress to revise the NSL statute.
XIII. USA PATRIOT ACT SEARCH WARRANTS
Search warrants have always been available to demand library
records, computers, backup tapes, or any other tangible item. 241 Search
warrants are immediately executable with or without the library's
cooperation.2 42 If a library is served with a search warrant, the normal
procedure is to ask to see a copy, and make sure that nothing beyond
237. The FBI has been known to abuse its powers. In the 1970s, abuses of power led
to the implementation of investigative guidelines, and the Senate committee set up to
review the problem, the Church Committee, found that "[o]pposition to government
policy or the expression of controversial views was frequently considered sufficient for
collecting data on Americans." S. REP. No. 94-755, at 169 (1976). The Church
Committee worried that "[w]here unsupported determinations as to 'potential' behavior
are the basis for surveillance of groups and individuals, no one is safe from the inquisitive
eye of the intelligence agency." Id. at 177-78.
238. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. § 8 (2007).
239. Id. §§ 2, 8. The two other bills about NSLs are the National Security Letter
Judicial and Congressional Oversight Act, H.R. 1739, 110th Cong. (2007), which would
require the approval of the FISC and would revise the deference a court should afford to
the government's certification that disclosure would harm the national security to a
rebuttable presumption, and the National Security Letters Reform Act of 2007, H.R.
3189, 110th Cong. (2007), which would limit the non-disclosure order to 180 days,
would require specific facts in any government certification regarding the danger to
national security, and would allow a motion to suppress evidence obtained unlawfully.
240. S. 2088 § 2.
241. "[A] search warrant may be directed to a library for any information, patron
specific or [not]," so long as the material "has evidentiary value." Strickland, Minow &
Lipinski, supra note 10, at 377.
242. Id. at 411.
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what is specified in the warrant is searched or taken.24 3 If a library is
served with a search warrant--or other judicial process-cooperation
and negotiation with law-enforcement officers is the best procedure to
follow. 244 You can and should request a brief delay to consult with your
counsel. The request might be granted or it might not, but you can
always ask. This request was granted in Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of
Thornton, and the final result of granting that request for delay was the
Colorado Supreme Court's decision, which refused to enforce the
warrant for the bookstore's patron purchase records on both First and
Fourth Amendment grounds.245
Polite but persistent refusal to comply with a request unless legal
process is issued may also result in the demand disappearing, as
happened to Washington librarian Joan Airoldi.246 An FBI agent came
into the library and asked for a list of all the people who had taken out a
book on Osama bin Laden, and the library, after consultation with an
attorney, refused.247 The FBI then issued a subpoena248 to try to find out
who had written a quotation from a bin Laden speech in the margin of
the book. The library trustees "voted unanimously to go to court to
quash the FBI subpoena," and "[f]ifteen days later, the FBI withdrew its
request.,,249 But it was a bittersweet victory for Ms. Airoldi, who knew
the result would have been different if her library has received a USA
PATRIOT Act order:
Fortunately for our patrons, we were able to mount a successful
challenge to what seems to have been a fishing expedition. If it
243. Id. at 412.
244. Id. at 384.
245. Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002). The warrant
was issued because the police found a mailer from the bookstore outside a meth lab, and
two books on setting up drug labs; the police were trying to discover customer purchase
records for the two books. Id. Long after the decision in the case, one of the defendants
authorized the bookstore to release the information on the book that had been in the
mailer: it was A Guide to Remembering Japanese Characters by Kenneth G. Henshall.
David Grogan, Reading Your Rights Tackles Tattered Cover Case, AM. BOOKSELLERS
ASS'N, Aug. 27, 2003, http://news.bookweb.org/freeexpression/1750.html.
246. Joan Airoldi, Librarian's Brush With FBI Shapes Her View of the USA Patriot
Act, USA TODAY, June 17, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/
2005-05-17-librarian-editx.htm.
247. Id.
248. A subpoena is not issued by a court so it is not technically "legal process." See
Strickland, Minow & Lipinski, supra note 10, at 379. It still cannot be ignored. See id.
249. Airoldi, supra note 246.
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had returned with an order from a secret court under the Patriot
Act, the FBI might now know which residents in our part of
Washington State had simply tried to learn more about bin
Laden.
With a Patriot Act order in hand, I would have been forbidden to
disclose even the fact that I had received it and would not have
been able to tell this story.25°
When a library is served with a search warrant, and a request for
court review prior to compliance is denied, the Fourth Amendment offers
protection from the harshness of the warrant's service: a court has at
least issued the warrant on a showing of probable cause;25' after the
warrant is served, the recipient can ask for a prompt determination of the
legality of the warrant by a federal district court. If the warrant was
improperly issued or implemented, the evidence seized pursuant to the
warrant may be suppressed.252 Also, there is a higher standard for search
warrants that are issued for library records, as the warrant implicates
250. Id.
251. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. Black's Law Dictionary defines
probable cause as
[a] reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a
crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime. Under the
Fourth Amendment, probable cause-which amounts to more than a bare
suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction-must be
shown before... [a] search warrant may be issued.
Probable cause may not be established simply by showing that the officer
who made the challenged arrest or search subjectively believed he had
grounds for his action .... If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people
would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects' only in the
discretion of the police."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1239 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3, at 140 (2d ed. 1992)).
252. 3A WRIGHT, KING & KLEIN, supra note 11, § 677, at 400.
If an unreasonable search has been made in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, it is not merely the material seized that cannot be admitted in
evidence. The government may not use the information thus improperly gained
as a means of finding proper evidence. In what the Court has rightly called "a
time-worn metaphor," the government is said to be barred from use of "a fruit
of the poisonous tree."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968);
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
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First Amendment rights.253
The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the reach of search warrants by
adding single-jurisdiction search warrants, which are good nationwide.
254
This allows a search warrant issued in one jurisdiction to be served in
any jurisdiction, for an indefinite period of time. The USA PATRIOT
Act also added delayed notice, or "sneak-and-peek" warrants, where the
person whose records are being seized is not notified of the search until
after the search has taken place. 255 Delayed notice warrants allow the
government, "either physically or virtually," "to secretly enter a home or
business," conduct the search, and leave without taking any "evidence or
leaving notice of their presence. 256  The USA PATRIOT Act also
broadened the types of electronic communications covered by search
warrants.257
XIV. THE REAUTHORIZATION ACT I CHANGED THE NOTICE AND
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS
The Reauthorization Act I changed the delayed-notification
253. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978).
254. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 219, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (codified at
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (Supp. 1 2001)). Warrants may be issued "by a Federal magistrate
judge in any district in which activities related to the terrorism may have occurred, for a
search" anywhere in the country. Id. Pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act, once the
search warrant has been issued, it is valid nationwide. Id. § 220, 115 Stat. at 292
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (Supp. I 2001)).
255. Id. § 213, 115 Stat. at 286 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3103a (Supp. I 2001)) (adding
the "sneak-and-peak" provisions, which stated that any notice required by law to be given
to the recipient of an order can be delayed "for a reasonable period," and the delayed
notice can be extended "for good cause shown").
256. BRIAN T. YEH & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., USA PATRIOT
IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 18 (2005),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf.
257. USA PATRIOT Act § 209, 115 Stat. at 283 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2703
(Supp. 1 2001)). Although the title of section 209 is "Seizure of Voice-Mail Messages
Pursuant to Warrants," the actual changes in statutory language merely add the word
"wire" to the statutes. Id. Several of the cases that have discussed search warrants as
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act have focused on the whether the district where the
crime is alleged to have occurred or the district where the records are held is the proper
court to issue the warrant. The district where the alleged crime occurred (Arizona) was
the proper district according to the court in In re Search of Yahoo, Inc., No. 07-3194-MB,
2007 WL 1539971, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007), although all the records were held by
Yahoo in California. The court cited with approval the unpublished case In Re Search
Warrant, No. 6:05-MC-168-Orl-31JGG, 2005 WL 3844032, at *13 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 23,
2005), agreeing that Congress intended "jurisdiction" to mean territorial jurisdiction.
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requirements. Notice must now be given within thirty days of the date of
the warrant, unless a request for an additional extension of time to give
notice is granted.258 Additional extensions of time to give notice are
limited to periods of ninety days.259 The Administrative Office of the
Courts is now required to issue an annual report to Congress that
includes the number of applications for delayed-notice search warrants,
"and the number of such warrants and extensions granted or denied
during the [previous] fiscal year.,
260
XV. Do THE DELAYED-NOTICE PROVISIONS MEET FOURTH
AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS?
Sneak-and-peek warrants allow surreptitious entry, and notice is not
given until a "reasonable" period after the search.26' In one case
analyzing a USA PATRIOT Act delayed-notice search warrant, the
district court thought that a valid delayed-notice search was probably
constitutional, since "the Supreme Court has ruled 'the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit all surreptitious entries.' ' '262 The district
court also noted the limits on surreptitious entries:
[T]he Ninth Circuit recognized: surreptitious searches and
seizures of intangibles strike at the very heart of the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment. The mere thought of
strangers walking through and visually examining the center of
our privacy interest, our home, arouses our passion for freedom
as does nothing else. That passion, the true source of the Fourth
Amendment demands that surreptitious entries be closely
circumscribed.263
258. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 114, 120 Stat. 192, 210 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3103a(b)-(c) (West
Supp. 2008)).
259. Id.
260. Id. § 114(c), 120 Stat. at 211 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3103a(d)(2) (West Supp.
2008)). The reporting requirement begins with the fiscal year ending September 30,
2007, so no report has yet been issued at the time of this writing. Id.
261. USA PATRIOT Act § 213, 115 Stat. at 286 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3103a (Supp.
12001)).
262. United States v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS, 2005 WL 3542519, at *1




Legal Process in the Library
Because the court that issued the delayed-notice search warrant had
not made the required finding that there was "'reasonable cause to
believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of the
warrant may have an adverse result,"' and because the order did not
specifically "'provide[] for the giving of such notice within a reasonable
period of its execution,"' the court denied the government's motion to
reconsider the order suppressing the evidence obtained with the
improperly issued delayed-notice search warrant. 64
XVI. SOME STATISTICS ON THE USE OF DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH
WARRANTS
There have been some statistics released on the use of delayed-notice
search warrants. The DOJ released its initial data in 2003, revealing that
during the period between October 26, 2001 and April 1, 2003, delayed-
notice warrants had been used forty-seven times.265 Requests for
delayed-notice warrants doubled in the period between April of 2003 and
January of 2005 to 108, for a total of 155 requests.266 No request for
delayed notice was ever denied. 267 "[Alpproximately [sixty] percent[]of
[the] requests were granted under the broad justification that notice
would have the result of 'seriously jeopardizing an investigation,' rather
than under the more specific criteria that notice would endanger a
person's life, imperil evidence, induce flight from prosecution or lead to
witness tampering. ' 268 Some targets of delayed-notice search warrants
have never been notified that they were the subjects of a clandestine
search.269 The chart on the following pages summarizes the changes
made by the USA PATRIOT Act and Reauthorization Act I.
264. Id. at *2 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3103a(b)(1), 3103a(b)(3)
(Supp. 12001)).
265. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Releases New Numbers on
Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/
opalpr/2005/April/05opa160.htm; Implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act: Sections
201, 202, 223 of the Act That Address Criminal Wiretaps, and Section 213 of the Act that
Addresses Delayed Notice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 28 (2005) (statement of
Sen. Howard Coble, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security).
266. See sources cited supra note 265.
267. See sources cited supra note 265.
268. USA PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th
Cong. 6 (2005) [hereinafter PATRIOTAct Hearing] (statement of Bob Barr).
269. See id.
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The list of reasons why a delayed-notice warrant can issue includes
several "catch-all" provisions. In addition to reasonable evidence of
flight, destruction of evidence, intimidation of a witness, and danger to
an individual, the court can issue a delayed-notice search warrant where
there is serious jeopardy to an investigation, or undue trial delay.
2 72
Because of these "catch-all" provisions, the potential for abuse of
delayed-notice search warrants cannot be ignored. Most delayed-notice
search warrants could in fact be issued under the catch-all provisions.273
A pending Senate bill addresses these problems by eliminating both
serious jeopardy to an investigation and undue trial delay as reasons why
a delayed-notice search warrant could issue, and requiring the delayed-
notice provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act to expire.
274
271. Id. § 3.
272. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2) (2000).
273. PATRIOT Act Hearing, supra note 268, at 49-50 (statement of James X.
Dempsey, Executive Director, Center for Democracy and Technology).
274. S. 2435.
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XVII. FISA WIRETAPS
A FISA roving wiretap is a general order that applies to any
communication provider or ISP that a suspect uses; the order need not
name the specific provider or ISP. 27 5 To have a request for a wiretap
order from the FISC approved, the applicant must show that "there is
probable cause to believe that.., the target ... is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power"; the government does not have to show
probable cause that one of the enumerated crimes has been or will be
committed.2 76 The government must also certify "that a significant
purpose of the surveillance is to [gather] foreign intelligence.,277 Prior
to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the government had to certify
that the purpose of the surveillance was to gather foreign intelligence.278
The USA PATRIOT Act also changed the scope of FISA wiretaps from
district-wide to nationwide service, and the wiretap can be attached to
any computer the target of the order uses, including a library
computer.279
XVIII. SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF THE STATUTES
Only a few courts have directly addressed the constitutionality of the
changes made by the USA PATRIOT Act to the FISA wiretap
provisions. In one instance, a decision of the FISC denied the
government's request to modify the existing minimization procedures for
obtaining and sharing FISA electronic surveillance, holding that the
government's proposed procedures gave criminal prosecutors too much
power to direct and control FISA searches or surveillance.280 This
275. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000).
276. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
277. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (Supp. 12001).
278. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(b) (Supp. 1 2001)).
279. Id. § 206, 115 Stat. at 282 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1 2001)).
280. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct.
Rev. 2002). This excessive power destroyed the "wall" between domestic criminal
investigations and foreign intelligence investigations in a manner that was not consistent
with FISA's mandate "to 'obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
information."' Id. at 623 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4)
(2000)). Prior to the district court's decision, the government had violated the existing
minimization procedures seventy-five times by erroneously alleging a FISA target was
not under criminal investigation, omitting material facts about the relationship between
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decision was overruled in the first-and only-published decision of the
FISA Court of Review, In re Sealed Case,28 1 which issued a decision on
the scope of the "significant purpose" language.282 The government's
argument that it could use a FISA wiretap warrant if the primary purpose
of the investigation was prosecuting an agent for a nonforeign
intelligence crime was rejected, but the court approved authorizing a
warrant where the government asserted any measurable foreign
intelligence purpose.283
In Mayfield v. United States,284 the government used the FISC's
process without any really good evidence that the target was an agent of
a foreign power.2 85 In March of 2004, Brandon Mayfield was arrested as
a suspect in the terrorist bombing in Madrid.286 Mayfield is an
American-born citizen, an army officer with an honorable discharge, a
practicing lawyer, had never been arrested, and had not traveled out of
the country since 1994; he is also a practicing Muslim. 28 Although the
fingerprint-match evidence for one of Mayfield's fingerprints was
questionable, the FBI sought and received broad search warrants for
Mayfield's home and office; he was arrested and his family was told that
he was being held as a primary suspect in the terrorist bombing in
288Madrid, and that there was a 100% match for his fingerprints. These
stories were leaked to the press. 89 Several weeks into Mayfield's
detention, the Spanish authorities notified the government that they had
matched the fingerprint to an Algerian, and Mayfield was released.
290
Mayfield filed suit, charging that the government's searches under FISA,
which allowed for circumvention of the Fourth Amendment's probable
the FBI and a FISA target, and making erroneous statements about meeting the
minimization procedures. Id. at 620-21.
281. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717.
282. Id,
283. Id. at 735-39. DOJ has interpreted this section to mean that FISA wiretaps can be
used primarily for criminal-investigation purposes. The USA PATRIOT Act in Practice:
Shedding Light on the FISA Process: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 20 (2002) (statement of William C. Banks, Professor of Law, Syracuse
University).
284. Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007).
285. Id. at 1026-29.
286. Id. at 1029.
287. Id. at 1027.
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cause requirements, violated the Constitution.2 9'
Mayfield's complaint directly attacked the "significant purpose"
language added by the USA PATRIOT Act. He alleged that the
government can improperly avoid the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment "merely by asserting a desire to also gather foreign
intelligence information from the person whom the government intends
to criminally prosecute," so long as the government represents that the
target was an agent of a foreign power.292  The government's
representation is an assertion the court must accept unless clearly
erroneous.293 The court agreed with Mayfield, stating:
Now, for the first time in our Nation's history, the government
can conduct surveillance to gather evidence for use in a criminal
case without a traditional warrant, as long as it presents a non-
reviewable assertion that it also has a significant interest in the
targeted person for foreign intelligence purposes.29 4
The government relied on In re Sealed Case, but the court rejected
the government's position that the case was "highly persuasive,"
disputing the reasoning of the case, and noting that even the In re Sealed
Case court conceded that "'the constitutional question presented by this
case-whether Congress' disapproval of the primary purpose test is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment-has no definitive jurisprudential
answer.' 295 The Mayfield court found the analysis in In re Sealed Case
contradictory and unnecessary: the "wall" and any "dangerous
confusion" the wall generated had been removed by another provision of
the USA PATRIOT Act, and criminal investigators are free to seek Title
III orders for criminal investigations, with that Title's definitions having
been expanded to include "virtually all terrorism and espionage-related
offenses. 296 The Mayfield court's final problem with the government's
position was based on fundamental issues of the appropriate checks and
balances required by the Constitution:
Moreover, the constitutionally required interplay between
291. Id. at 1030.
292. Id. at 1032-33.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1036.
295. Id. at 1041 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)).
296. Id.
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Executive action, Judicial decision, and Congressional
enactment, has been eliminated by the FISA amendments....
The Constitution contains bedrock principles that the framers
believed essential. Those principles should not be easily altered
by the expediencies of the moment.
Despite this, the FISCR holds that the Constitution need not
control the conduct of criminal surveillance in the United States.
In place of the Fourth Amendment, the people are expected to
defer to the Executive Branch and its representation that it will
authorize such surveillance only when appropriate. The
defendant here is asking this court to, in essence, amend the Bill
of Rights, by giving it an interpretation that would deprive it of
any real meaning. This court declines to do so.
For over 200 years, this Nation has adhered to the rule of
law-with unparalleled success. A shift to a Nation based on
extra-constitutional authority is prohibited, as well as ill-
advised....
... I conclude that 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1823, as amended
by the Patriot Act, are unconstitutional because they violate the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.297
Several other cases have looked at the overlap between criminal and
foreign-intelligence investigations in the context of requests to suppress
the use of evidence obtained in a foreign-intelligence investigation in a
trial for domestic crimes. These cases have focused on the differing
standards for probable cause for a Title III warrant and a FISA warrant.
These defendants have not been so successful. In United States v. Ning
Wen, 298 the defendant was being tried for "violating the export-control
laws by providing militarily useful technology to the People's Republic
of China without the required license," based on evidence from a FISC
order for international-terrorism surveillance. 299 The court found that
there was no constitutional prohibition on using the evidence from a
FISA order in a domestic crime case:
Probable cause to believe that a foreign agent is communicating
with his controllers outside our borders makes an interception
297. Id. at 1042-43.
298. United States v. Ning Wen, 477 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2007).
299. Id. at 897.
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reasonable. If, while conducting this surveillance, agents
discover evidence of a domestic crime, they may use it to
prosecute for that offense. That the agents may have known that
they were likely to hear evidence of domestic crime does not
make the interception less reasonable than if they were ignorant
of this possibility .... It is enough that the intercept be
adequately justified without regard to the possibility that
evidence of domestic offenses will turn up. Interception of
Wen's conversations was adequately justified under FISA's
terms, so there is no constitutional obstacle to using evidence of
any domestic crimes he committed.3 °°
In United States v. Damrah, °1 the defendant "was found guilty of
unlawfully obtaining citizenship... by making false statements in a
citizenship application and interview." 302  Some of the evidence was
reviewed ex parte by the court, as it had been obtained pursuant to a
FISC order; the court summarily rejected Damrah's Fourth Amendment
claim.30 3 And a FISA warrant was upheld in United States v. Rosen,3°
where the defendants were charged with conspiring to communicate
national defense information; the defendants were U.S. persons whose
lobbying activities were partly protected by the First Amendment. The
court ruled that the government's allegations that some of the
300. Id. at 898-99.
301. United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2005).
302. Id. at 620.
303. Id. at 624-25. The court noted that "FISA has uniformly been held to be
consistent with the Fourth Amendment," citing In re Sealed Case with approval. Id. at
625. Of course Mayfield had not been decided yet. In several other cases, defendant's
motions to suppress have been denied, sometimes on procedural grounds, as in United
States v. Jayyousi, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 781373, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2007)
(rejecting claims that defendant's actions were protected by the First Amendment). In
United States v. Benkahla, 437 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2006), the court rejected the
defendant's claim that his computer was illegally seized; the court only analyzed pre-
USA PATRIOT Act case law as no other authority had been provided. Id. In United
States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007
WL 2011319 (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2007), the defendants, charged with funding terrorist
organizations such as Hamas, alleged that the primary purpose of the surveillance was
criminal, but the district court relied on the analysis in In re Sealed Case that was rejected
by the Mayfield court and held that FISA did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
*5. In United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 778, 780 (N.D. Ill. 2006), the court was
faced with a pre-USA PATRIOT Act FISA warrant for a physical search, and held that
the search was reasonable and was authorized for "foreign intelligence."
304. United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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defendants' lobbying activities were unlawful were sufficient to
overcome the statutory bar on using FISA for activities protected by the
First Amendment.
30 5
The question of whether or not the commingling of criminal
investigations with foreign intelligence investigations, as currently
authorized by FISA, comports with the Fourth Amendment remains to be
finally resolved. Faced with a clear case where the government used the
FISC, and its simpler standards of probable cause, when it was pursuing
a criminal claim, the Mayfield court found that FISA did not comport
with the Fourth Amendment. 30 6 But where the facts differed in that the
original aim of the investigation was to obtain foreign intelligence, and
the defendant was later charged with a crime, the courts have been just as
motivated to find that FISA does comport with the Fourth Amendment.
XIX. CHANGES MADE BY THE REAUTHORIZATION ACTS
In order to get a court order authorizing a wiretap, the crime must be
statutorily designated a "predicate offense. 3 °7 The Reauthorization Act I
expanded the list of predicate offenses to include
crimes relating to biological weapons, violence at international
airports, nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats,
explosive materials, receiving terrorist military training, terrorist
attacks against mass transit, arson within U.S. special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction, torture, firearm attacks in federal
facilities, killing federal employees, killing certain foreign
officials, conspiracy to commit violence overseas, harboring
terrorists, assault on a flight crew member with a dangerous
weapon, certain weapons offenses aboard an aircraft, aggravated
identity theft, "smurfing" (a money laundering technique
whereby a large monetary transaction is separated into smaller
transactions to evade federal reporting requirements on large
transactions), and criminal violations of certain provisions of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.3°8
305. Id. at 541, 548-49.
306. Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007).
307. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2000).
308. YEH & DOYLE, supra note 256, at 24.
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The Reauthorization Act I added a requirement that the government
describe the specific target of a wiretap in its application for an order
when the target's identity is not known, and added a requirement that the
government articulate specific facts in support of an application for a
roving wiretap.309 When the government changes the location of the
roving surveillance to a new location that was not known at the time of
the application, the court issuing the wiretap must be notified within ten
days. 310  A description of the total number of applications for roving
wiretaps made each year now has to be reported to congressional
committees. 311 The Reauthorization Act I extends the expiration date of
the section of the USA PATRIOT Act authorizing roving wiretaps to
December 31, 2009.312
XX. SOME STATISTICS ON WIRETAPS
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts issues a yearly
report on electronic surveillance in general, and in 2005, state and federal
courts authorized 1,773 interceptions of wire, oral, and electronic
313communications, an increase over the previous year. Only one
application was denied by the courts. 314 In 2004, state and federal courts
authorized 1,710 interceptions of wire, oral, and electronic
communications.315 This was an increase of nineteen percent over
intercepts approved in 2003. 316 Federal officials applied for 730
309. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 108, 120 Stat. 192, 203 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1804(a)(3),
1805(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2008)).
310. Id. § 108(b)(4) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(c)(3) (West Supp. 2008)).
311. Id. § 108(c)(2), 120 Stat. at 204 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1808(a)(2) (West Supp.
2008)).
312. Id. § 102(b), 120 Stat. at 195 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 note (West Supp.
2008) (Sunset Provisions)).
313. LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON
APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE,
ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 5 (2006), available at http://epic.org/
privacy/wiretap/2005_wiretap-report.pdf. The report does not include FISA orders.
314. Id.
315. LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON
APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE,
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intercept orders in 2004, a twenty-six percent increase over the number
requested in 2003.317 No wiretap applications were denied.318 In 2003,
there were 1,442 interceptions of wire, oral, and electronic
communications, an increase of six percent over interceptions authorized
in 2002.319 The agency also reported that federal officials applied for
578 intercept orders in 2003, a sixteen percent increase over those
requested in 2002.320 No wiretap applications were denied.321 These
statistics do not include FISA roving wiretaps; information available on
FISA roving wiretaps is included in a letter report the Attorney General
makes to Congress, which showed that applications for FISA
surveillance orders have also increased over the reported years, and that
applications are not denied.322 The chart on the following pages
describes the changes made to the roving-wiretap laws by the USA
PATRIOT Act and the Reauthorization Act I.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 7.
319. LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON
APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE,
ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 5 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
wiretap03/2003WireTap.pdf.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 7.
322. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Dennis Hastert, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 28, 2006)
[hereinafter Speaker Letter Two], http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2005rept.html;
Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Dennis Hastert, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 1, 2005) [hereinafter
Speaker Letter One], http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2004rept.pdf. See also infra
notes 342 and 343 and accompanying text.
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power .... [N]o specifies the type
[U.S.] person may be of description if the
considered a foreign target's identity is
power or an agent of not known; new
a foreign power locations must be
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323. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000).
324. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (West Supp. 2008); Id. § 1805.
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§§ 1804, USA PATRIOT USA PATRIOT Re-Authorization
1805 Act Act Act
Gag Order Yes, must comply The same. The same.




a manner as will
protect its




Review of Implied, not specific. The same. The same.
the Order
Sunset N/A Yes. December 31,
2009.326
XXI. SECTION 216 & SECTION 214 PEN REGISTER/TRAP-AND-TRACE
ORDERS
The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the scope of pen register/trap-
and-trace orders 327 in national-security cases. There are two types of pen
325. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2000).
326. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 note (West Supp. 2008) (Sunset Provisions).
327. "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is
released."' Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (quoting United States v.
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)). The trap-and-trace device is the reverse of
a pen register; it records incoming information. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (Supp. I 2001).
Both will be referred to as "pen registers." Because recording incoming and outgoing
telephone numbers was not considered a "search" requiring a warrant under Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. at 745-46, the original pen-register statute offered more procedural
protection than had been available. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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register orders that were changed by the USA PATRIOT Act. Section
216 affected pen register orders issued by federal courts, and allowed the
courts to issue pen register orders for real-time interception of non-
content information from computers, not just from telephones.328 Section
214 gave the FISC the same expanded authority. 329 It was section 216
orders that got all the press, but section 216 was unchanged by the
Reauthorization Acts.
One of the issues left unresolved by the remorseless advance of
technology has been how to deal with the fact that IP addresses and
telephone numbers have the capability to reveal content. Even telephone
calls can reveal a lot more content than the number dialed. When you
call the bank and give your account information, or call the pharmacy
and order prescriptions using a credit card on an automated system, you
reveal content. When a device uses tone detection to generate a list of all
digits dialed after a call has been connected, it "is called 'post-cut-
through dialed digit extraction.' '330 IP addresses also can reveal content.
In In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Use of a Pen
Register & Trap On (XXA) Internet Serv. Account/User Name,
(xxxxxxxx@xxx.com), the court was troubled by the government's
application for
[IP] addresses[,] which are defined as a "unique numerical
address identifying each computer on the internet." The [ISP]
would be required to turn over to the government the incoming
and outgoing IP addresses "used to determine web-sites visited"
using the particular account which is the subject of the pen
register.
328. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 288-90 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 3123, 3124, 3127 (Supp. I 2001)). For a more detailed discussion of
the changes made to section 216 by the USA PATRIOT Act, see Susan Nevelow Mart,
Protecting the Lady From Toledo: Post-USA PATRIOT Act Electronic Surveillance at
the Library, 96 LAw LIBR. J. 449,452-53 (2004).
329. USA PATRIOT Act § 214, 115 Stat. at 286-87 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842-
1843 (Supp. 1 2001)).
330. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register & Trap
On (XXX) Internet Serv. Account/User Name, (xxxxxxxx@xxx.com), 396 F. Supp. 2d
45, 48 n.2 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 456
(D.C. Cir. 2000)). See also In re Application of U.S. For an Order Authorizing the
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Trap & Trace Device on E-Mail Account,
416 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2006) (granting the government's request for a pen-register
order for non-content email information).
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... A user may visit the Google site. Presumably the pen
register would capture the IP address for that site. However, if
the user then enters a search phrase, that search phrase would
appear in the URL after the first forward slash. This would
reveal content .... 331
The court was concerned that ISPs would not be alert to the subtle
distinctions between "incoming and outgoing IP addresses" and content,
and rewrote the pen register order so that the ISP had to configure its
software so that "subject lines, application commands, search queries,
requested file names, and file paths" would not be recovered, and
imposed possible contempt of court penalties on the ISP for failure to
comply. 332 The court hoped that technology could solve the problem of
improper collection of content. So far, courts have relied on government
assertions that ISPs can remove content from the information
provided.333
In the case of telephone numbers, technology is not currently up to
the challenge. In a case from the Southern District of Texas, the court
denied the government's application for a pen register order involving
cell phones because the government had declared that "'technology
currently is not reasonably available which would permit law
enforcement to reliably discern and then separately collect only those
post-cut-through digits that are call processing information from those
that may constitute content.' ' 334 The court rejected the government's
pledge that it would make no affirmative use of content digits, and held
that the USA PATRIOT Act amendments require more than over-
collection of content and promises not to use it: "shall not include
contents" is a clear statutory commandment, and the government either
needs to develop better technology or use other statutory means to obtain
the information.335
331. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register & Trap
On (XXA9 Internet Serv. Account/User Name, (xxxxxxxx@xxx.com), 396 F. Supp. 2d at
48-49.
332. Id. at 49-50.
333. See cases cited supra note 330.
334. In re United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822-23 (S.D. Tex. 2006). See also In re
U.S. for Orders (1) Authorizing Use of Pen Registers and Trap & Trace Devices, 515 F.
Supp. 2d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); In re United States, No. H-07-613, 2007 WL 3036849, at
*9 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (refusing to issue a pen-register order for post-cut-through dialed
digits).
335. In re United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 825-26.
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The Sixth Circuit has expressly ruled on the limits of collecting
emails before the Fourth Amendment must be satisfied: to/from
addresses and IP addresses are not content and can be recovered without
a warrant, but URLs that reveal what page of a website a user viewed are
content and a warrant based on probable cause must be issued before
content can be recovered.3 36 Section 214 pen register orders are issued
by the FISC,337 but otherwise the post-USA PATRIOT Act processes are
similar. Both section 216 and section 214 orders could attach to a library
computer, and if library equipment is not able to record what the
government wants, the government can attach its own equipment.
XXII. CHANGES MADE BY THE REAUTHORIZATION ACT I
The 2006 amendments changed several things about FISA pen
register orders. The scope of information that can be provided pursuant
to a pen register order was expanded by the Reauthorization Act I, and
the court may now order the service provider to turn over customer
information as well as the dialing or Internet address information.339 The
duration of the order may now be up to one year: if "the applicant has
certified that the information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence
information not concerning a United States person, an order, or an
336. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 469-76 (6th Cir. 2007). This analysis
was followed by the court in In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic
Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585
(W.D. Pa. 2008), to deny the government's request for cell-phone-subscriber information
for use in identifying the user's past or present physical or geographical location.
337. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 214, 115 Stat. 272, 286-87 (codified at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1842-1843 (Supp. 12001)).
338. Id. § 216(b)(1), 115 Stat. at 288-89 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (Supp. 12001)).
The software developed by the government was known as Carnivore, and is now known
as DCS 1000. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Robert S. Mueller, III to be
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 108 (2001) (statement of Robert S. Mueller).
339. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 128, 120 Stat. 192, 229 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)(2)(C) (West
Supp. 2008)). The information includes the name and address of the customer or
subscriber; the telephone or instrument number, or other subscriber number or identifier
of the customer or subscriber, including any temporarily assigned network address or
associated routing or transmission information; how long the target has been a customer
of the provider and the terms of service; if it is a telephone service, any local or long-
distance telephone records of the customer or subscriber; any records reflecting period of
usage (or sessions) by the customer or subscriber; and information about payment,
including credit-card or bank-account numbers. Id.
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extension of an order, under this section may be for a period not to
exceed one year., 340  Reauthorization Act I also requires additional
reporting: the Judiciary Committee must receive full reports on the use
of pen registers/trap-and-trace devices every six months.341
XXIII. SOME STATISTICS ON THE USE OF FISA COURT PROCESS
The information that is available about the FISC is not very specific.
In "2005, the [g]overnment made 2,074 applications to the. .. [FISC] for
authority to conduct electronic surveillance and physical search for
foreign intelligence purposes," of which 2,072 "applications for authority
to conduct electronic surveillance and physical search" were approved.342
In 2004, the government made 1,758 applications to the FISC for
authority to conduct electronic surveillance and physical search for
foreign-intelligence purposes, and none were denied.343  The changes
made to section 214 pen registers are summarized in the chart on the
pages that follow.
340. Id. § 105, 120 Stat. at 195-96 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842(e)(2) (West Supp.
2008)).
341. Id. §128(b), 120 Stat. at 229 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1846(a) (West Supp.
2008)).
342. Speaker Letter Two, supra note 322. "The FISC made substantive modifications
to the [g]overnment's proposed orders in [sixty-one] of those applications." Id. "The
FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any application filed by the [g]overnment during
calendar year 2005." Id.
343. Speaker Letter One, supra note 322.
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344. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842(e)(2) (West Supp. 2008).
345. Id. § 1842(d)(2)(C).
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XXIV. FISHING EXPEDITIONS-WHAT IS ALL THIS IN AID OF?
Looking at government fishing expeditions for information, both
more narrowly in the case of libraries and bookstores, which have
traditionally been safe havens for access to information, or more broadly
in the case of government data-mining efforts,34 6 one must ask if the
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act has been a benefit to the
cause of preventing terrorism. The balance between the preservation of
civil liberties and the prevention of terrorism has always been the crux of
the surveillance problem, whether you believe that the government has
been overzealous in its efforts to prevent terrorism at the expense of civil
liberties, or believe that it has not been zealous enough. So a brief look
at the government's own analysis of what terrorist acts it has managed to
prevent since it was granted expanded powers by the USA PATRIOT
Act should be instructive.
The DOJ just published Terrorism 2002-2005,347 to "provide[] an
overview of the terrorist incidents and preventions designated by the FBI
as having taken place in the United States and its territories during the
years 2002 through 2005 and that are matters of public record., 348 From
September 12, 2001 through 2005, the DOJ lists twenty-seven incidents
of terrorist attacks in the United States. 349 Twenty-two of those incidents
were perpetrated by the Earth Liberation Front or the Animal Liberation
Front and involved crimes against property.350  The remaining five
incidents are as follows:
346. Although a discussion of all of the government's broad data-collection efforts is
beyond the scope of this article, the government's efforts at fishing expeditions have not
been limited to the library. For a review of the government's attempts to maintain broad
databases of information on "U.S. persons," see for example Frederick M. Joyce &
Andrew E. Bigart, Liability For All, Privacy For None: The Conundrum of Protecting
Privacy Rights in a Pervasively Electronic World, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1481 (2007);
Andrew P. MacArthur, Note, The NSA Phone Call Database: The Problematic
Acquisition and Mining of Call Records in the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and Australia, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 441 (2007); Steven W. Dummer,
Comment, Secure Flight and Data Veillance, a New Type of Civil Liberties Erosion:
Stripping Your Rights When You Don't Even Know It, 75 Miss. L.J. 583 (2006).
347. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM 2002-2005
(2006) [hereinafter TERRORISM], available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/
terrorism2002_2005.pdf.
348. Id. at iii. The terrorism report also includes major FBI investigations overseas and
identifies significant prosecutorial updates, legislative actions, and program
developments relevant to counter-terrorism efforts.
349. Id. at 65-66.
350. Id.
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" the 2001 Anthrax mailings with no known perpetrator (5
deaths);
* a shooting at Los Angeles International Airport by Hesham
Mohamed Ali Hedayat (2 deaths);
" two separate bombings in California suspected to have been
committed by Daniel Andreas San Diego, an animal-rights
activist; and
" an arson in Oklahoma City attributed to Sean Michael
Gillespie of the Aryan Nation.351
The terrorism report concluded that the longstanding trend is that
"domestic extremists [carry] out the majority of terrorist incidents" in the
United States.352  Regarding terrorist preventions, defined as "a
documented instance in which a violent act by a known or suspected
terrorist group or individual with the means and a proven propensity for
violence is successfully interdicted through investigative activity," 353 the
terrorism report has this to say:
The terrorist preventions for 2002 through 2005 paint a more
diverse threat picture. Eight of the [fourteen] recorded terrorist
preventions stemmed from right-wing extremism, and included
disruptions to plotting by individuals involved with the militia,
white supremacist, constitutionalist and tax protester, and anti-
abortion movements. The remaining preventions included
disruptions to plotting by an anarchist in Bellingham,
Washington, who sought to bomb a U.S. Coast Guard station; a
plot to attack an Islamic center in Pinellas Park, Florida; and a
plot by a prison-originated, Muslim convert group to attack U.S.
military, Jewish, and Israeli targets in the greater Los Angeles
area. In addition, three preventions involved individuals who
sought to provide material support to foreign terrorist




352. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
353. Id. at v.
354. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
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These three preventions took place in 2005, and involved a lone person's
meeting with undercover officers to present a design for a bomb that the
suspect "intended to build and sell"; the arrest of two armed robbers who
were allegedly raising money for a Muslim convert organization founded
in prison; and the arrest of one person at a motel in Pocatello, Idaho after
he arranged "to meet a purported al-Qa'ida contact. 355
So the apparatus of the war on terror has been directed at animal
rights activists, homegrown right-wing types, two armed robbers, and
two want-to-be terrorists -who met with undercover officers. There is, of
course, no way of knowing the extent to which the expanded powers
granted to the government by the USA PATRIOT Act contributed to
these preventions. Although we know that the use of section 215 orders
has not contributed to a prevention,356 other USA PATRIOT Act legal
process may have contributed to these preventions, and prevention is a
worthy goal.
But the DOJ has yet to meet its goal of "striking the appropriate
balance between meeting its critical counterterrorism-related
responsibilities and respecting civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy
rights."3 57  The USA PATRIOT Act needs to be revised to mandate
criteria that impose that balance. It takes years for the orders of courts to
become final and affect agency policy. It is not too much to ask of our
representatives that they pass legislation that protect civil liberties
because, as Thomas Jefferson pointed out, "In questions of power, then,
let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from
mischief by the chains of the Constitution. 358
355. Id. at 25. See also Guy Lawson, The Fear Factory, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 7, 2008,
at 60 (discussing a story on the Joint Terrorism Task Force and some overblown claims
of terrorist cells). Rolling Stone also has an online list of all of the Bush Administration's
terrorist alerts, the lack of factual intelligence information that might form a basis for the
alert, and what else was happening in the news on any given day that was embarrassing
to the administration. See Tim Dickinson, Truth or Terrorism? The Real Story Behind
Five Years of High Alerts: A History of the Bush Administration's Most Dubious Terror
Scares and the Headlines They Buried, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 7, 2008,
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/1 8056504/truthor_terrorismthe_real story_
behindfiveyears ofjhigh_alerts.
356. SECTION 215 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 79.
357. Performance Challenges, supra note 220.
358. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 161.
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